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The aim of this study is to achieve a better understanding of corporate governance 
structures and mechanisms outside the United States by looking at a specific 
emerging economy: Venezuela. We first build a corporate governance practices 
index for publicly listed companies in this country; the overall results indicate that 
Venezuela exhibits relatively low corporate governance scores. Using this limited 
sample, we are able to find a positive relation between this corporate governance 
index and its sub-components and alternative measures of value (Tobin’s q, price-
to-book ratio, and dividend payout). In this environment, together with an 
underdeveloped financial market, a weak legal system, poor law enforcement, and 
high ownership concentration, we then address the question of whether the 
existing corporate governance system works at all in Venezuela. In particular, we 
are interested in studying the following two questions, which constitute a 
necessary condition for any corporate governance system to work. First, are 
poorly-performing CEOs more likely to be removed compared to well-performing 
CEOs? Second, is the role of the board to monitor the CEO or merely to serve as 
an advisor? To this end, we collected detailed data from 51 Venezuelan firms 
from 1984 to 2002. After controlling for characteristics related to CEO, board, 
ownership, firms, and time periods, we find that poor financial performance 
significantly increases the likelihood of CEO and director turnover. The empirical 
evidence is also consistent with the idea that directors in Venezuela play mainly 
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1. Introduction 
 
Firms in emerging economies sometimes cannot fund even superb projects because investors are 
afraid they will not get their money back. This expropriation risk is the essence of corporate 
governance, and the empirical evidence shows that there are great differences among corporate 
governance mechanisms around the world. This is particularly illustrated by La Porta, López-de-
Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (La Porta et al., 2000a, hereafter referred to as LLSV). 
  Although the whole range of corporate governance mechanisms has been studied in depth 
for the case of the United States and other developed economies,
1 not much work has been done 
for the rest of the world, and especially in the emerging markets. A recent exception is Gibson 
(2003), who reports that poorly performing managers in eight emerging markets are more likely 
to be replaced, leading him to the conclusion that corporate governance mechanisms in these 
emerging economies are effective.
2 This finding is important because a necessary condition for 
any corporate governance system to be able to work, is to insure that a poorly performing 
manager will be more likely to be removed from his or her position than a well performing 
manager. 
The aim of this study is to continue the effort to achieve a better understanding of 
corporate governance structures and mechanisms outside the United States and the rest of the 
developed world by looking at a specific emerging economy: Venezuela. We first build a 
corporate governance index for publicly listed companies in this market using standard corporate 
governance measures contained in a questionnaire adapted from Klapper and Love (2002). The 
overall results indicate that Venezuela would be located in the average of the 14 emerging 
markets reported by these two authors, and the results further show that public companies in 
Venezuela exhibit relatively low corporate governance scores, especially in the categories of 
general principles and officers and the board of directors. The scores on shareholders and on 
disclosure and information are relatively better. We then conducted a number of nonparametric 
tests and regression analysis to test the relation between this corporate governance index and its 
sub-components and a set of three alternative measures of value (Tobin’s q, price-to-book ratio, 
                                                 
1 See Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Denis and McConnell (2003) for a complete literature review. 
2 This author analyzed the largest public firms in Brazil, Chile, India, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Taiwan, and 
Thailand, using the Worldscope database. 
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and dividend payout). In general, we find a positive relation between the corporate governance 
index and our value measures. 
In this environment of relatively low corporate governance scores, together with an 
underdeveloped financial market, a weak legal system, poor law enforcement, and high 
ownership concentration,
3 we then address the question of whether the existing corporate 
governance system works in Venezuela. This is important because all of these issues are present 
in many Latin America countries and emerging markets around the world; therefore, Venezuela 
becomes an ideal case study on how the governance system works in this type of environment. 
Moreover, the Venezuelan Commercial Code makes the board of directors responsible for the 
management of the firm. More specifically, we would like to answer the following two questions 
in this paper. First, are poor performing managers more likely to be removed than good 
performing managers? Second, is the role of the board to monitor the CEO or to serve as an 
advisor? This contribution is important because, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
country-specific analysis on how firm performance affects the likelihood of CEO and director 
turnover in a specific Latin American country.
4  
To this end, we collected detailed data from 51 Venezuelan firms from 1984 to 2002 and 
constructed an unbalanced panel (878 observations) to study how the likelihood of CEO and 
director turnover is explained by firms’ financial performance. After controlling for CEO 
characteristics, board characteristics, ownership, firm characteristics, and time periods, we find 
that, for this sample of Venezuelan firms, bad financial performance significantly increases the 
likelihood of CEO and director turnover. The empirical evidence is also consistent with the idea 
that directors in Venezuela play a role of mainly advising rather than monitoring the CEO, as we 
will show below. 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present an overview 
of the Venezuelan economy, the Venezuelan stock market and the legal framework of the 
country’s capital markets. We also present the results of a survey we conducted on corporate 
governance practices in Venezuela and try to relate results from the questionnaire to measures of 
                                                 
3 Authors such as Lefort and Walker (2005) have argued that the observed high ownership concentration in Latin 
American economies make the boards weaker than in developed economies rendering them to be a poor governance 
tool. 
4 See Brunello, Graziano and Parigi (2000) and Volpin (2002) for a similar investigation in Italy, and Renneboog 
(2000) for a similar investigation in Belgium. See also Claessens and Djankov (1999), and Crespi and Gispert 
(1998) for somewhat similar studies in the Czech Republic and Spain, respectively. 
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value. In Section 3, we show the database used to examine how performance affects the 
likelihood of CEO and director turnover in Venezuela. In Section 4, we develop the empirical 
analysis to test our hypotheses and review some of the previous literature on the subject. In 
Section 5, we present a set of robustness checks to the results obtained. Finally, in Section 6 we 
conclude and discuss our findings. 
 
2. Institutional Characteristics 
 
2.1. An Overview of the Venezuelan Economy and its Stock Market  
 
The Venezuelan economy is characterized by the preeminence of oil, which accounts for about 
one third of GDP and half of government revenue, and represents the main source of foreign 
currency. Since the oil industry is state-owned, the government has considerable influence on the 
economy. By the end of 2004, Venezuela’s GDP was expected to have reached $100 billion, the 
fourth largest in Latin America. 
The Caracas Stock Exchange (Bolsa de Valores de Caracas, BVC, 
www.caracasstock.com) was founded in 1947. Previous to that date, stock trades were performed 
over-the-counter. By the end of 2004, 57 companies were listed on the BVC, less than half of 
which trade regularly. Moreover, the Caracas Stock Exchange has experienced a severe decline 
in traded volumes since the mid-1990s as a result of a declining economy, the migration of 
stocks to the U.S. markets in the form of American Depositary Receipts (ADRs), the takeovers to 
to which a number of firms have been subject, with a concomitant reduction in the number of 
shares available for trade, and an increasing country risk that has frightened investors, 
particularly foreign investors.
5 In fact, daily trading volume has decreased from the equivalent to 
$25 to $30 million in 1997 to less than $1 million by 2000, and it has not recovered since then 
(Garay, 2001).  The BVC has survived during this period thanks to the growing trading of 
government debt securities. Stock prices, measured by the Indice Bursátil Caracas, have also 
been depressed during the past decade and have not recovered to the highest-ever levels 
experienced, in dollar terms, in 1991. According to the International Finance Corporation, the 
                                                 
5 For instance, the company Electricidad de Caracas, the second-largest firm in terms of market capitalization and 
traded volumes on the BVC, was the subject of a successful hostile takeover bid by the U.S. company AES 
Corporation in 2000. As a result, more than 80 percent of the stocks of Electricidad de Caracas no longer trade on 
the exchange. 
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market value of the Venezuelan stock market was $7 billion in 2000, or just about 6 percent of 
GDP.  
Capital issues have decreased dramatically during the past five years as the economy 
entered a severe recession. No new listing of companies has taken place in recent years, while a 
small number of companies have de-listed; bond issues by listed companies have also decreased. 
This trend has accentuated the importance of bank loans as the main source of funding for 
Venezuelan companies, although total bank loans as a percentage of GDP have also decreased 
during this period (Garay and Molina, 2004). The fact that a new pension funds law has still not 
been approved by Congress has not helped the market attract the much-needed presence of long-
term funds for investment in various capital market instruments issued by local corporations.  
As in most countries in Latin America, groups represent the typical corporate structure in 
Venezuela (LLSV, 1999). Dahlquist et al.  (2003) document that by 1997, 62 percent of the total 
market capitalization of the BVC was held by insiders. Today, that number is higher since a 
number of takeovers and mergers have occurred, most notably AES-Electricidad de Caracas, 
Polar-Mavesa, and a number of bank mergers.   
 
2.2. The Venezuelan Capital Market’s Legal Framework  
 
Venezuela’s institutional setting, as in most of the developing economies in the world, differs a 
great deal from those in advanced economies, especially the U.S.
6 Venezuela’s legal origin is 
French civil law, which is generally characterized as having the weakest investor protection of 
all types, which consequently leads to less developed capital markets (LLSV, 1997). 
The Commercial Code (Código de Comercio) and the Securities Market Law (Ley de 
Mercado de Capitales or SML) represent the umbrella under which capital markets and listed 
companies operate in Venezuela. The Commercial Code was enacted in 1955, while the 
Securities Market Law was enacted in 1975 and amended in 1998.  
The SML regulates the public offer of stocks and other medium and long-term financial 
instruments, except for those issued by the government or those regulated by the Banking Law 
(Ley General de Bancos y Otros Institutos de Crédito) and the National Savings and Loans Law 
(Ley del Sistema Nacional de Ahorro y Préstamo). The main supervisory entity of the 
                                                 
6 Also, there are substantial institutional differences when compared to other well-studied economies such as Japan 
and Germany. In these countries the corporate governance model is generally described as relationship-oriented, 
where banks play a major role in monitoring management (Shleifer and Vishy, 1997). 
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Venezuelan capital markets, the Comisión Nacional de Valores or CNV (www.cnv.gov.ve), was 
created under the Securities Market Law of 1975, and it is affiliated with the Finance Ministry.
7 
The President of the CNV is appointed by the President for four years and can be reelected. The 
CNV has four directors, also appointed by the President, for three years; they can be reelected as 
well.     
Public corporations must be registered at the Securities Registrar (Registro Nacional de 
Valores) administered by the CNV. Listed companies must also provide all relevant information 
to the CNV in a timely fashion and produce financial statements, which must be externally 
audited. The stock exchange may stop transactions at any time provided there is reasonable 
suspicion of the existence of relevant information not revealed to the market. The stock exchange 
must inform the CNV within 24 hours, and transactions may remain suspended for up to five 
days.  
The SML requires companies registered with the CNV to be administered by a board of 
directors composed of at least five members who will remain in their positions for at least one 
year and can be reelected. Any group of stockholders representing at least 20 percent of a 
company’s stocks has the right to elect at least one member of the board of directors. According 
to terms of Resolution No. 49-2001 of March 2001, the CNV regulates the process whereby  
minority shareholders can elect members of the board of directors.  
The Commercial Code mandates that companies regulated by the CNV have two 
commissaries (comisarios), who are elected by shareholders in the general meeting to supervise 
the work of and the financial statements presented by the board of directors to stockholders at the 
annual meeting. The commissaries also have unlimited access to all the operations of the 
company. With the explicit intention of protecting minority shareholders, the SML also requires  
public companies to distribute to shareholders at least 50 percent of the net income obtained 
during the fiscal year, of which at least 25 percent must be in the form of cash dividends. 
Companies with accumulated losses from previous years may be exempted from this requirement 
until they compensate such deficit. 
The CNV has additionally enacted a number of recent reforms with the intention of 
protecting minority shareholders and promoting greater disclosure. For example, during the 
                                                 
7 The Venezuelan banking system is supervised by the Superintendency of Banks and Financial Institutions 
(Superintendencia de Bancos y de Otras Instituciones Financieras). 
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aforementioned hostile takeover bid of Electricidad de Caracas by AES Corporation, the CNV 
required the latter company to purchase all the shares that were submitted during the public 
acquisition offer, even though AES Corporation only needed 51 percent of the shares to control 
the company, thus benefiting minority shareholders. In terms of disclosure, recent decisions by 
the CNV require listed companies to abide by international accounting standards.  
In order to assess institutional differences among different countries, LLSV (1997) 
constructed two variables assessing the legal protection afforded an individual shareholder in 
different countries around the world. The first of these variables is called Anti-director rights,
8 
and the second is the perceived quality of the country’s legal system and law enforcement,   
country, which they called rule of law.
9 As seen in Table 1, an individual investor will be less 
protected in Venezuela than in the average Latin American country, based on the Anti-director 
rights index, and much less protected when compared with the United States. In terms of the rule 
of law, Venezuela’s index is slightly higher than the average Latin America country, but it is still 
substantially below the U.S. index. 
The other four variables in Table 1 represent proxies for size and depth of the capital 
market and attempt to measure the effect of legal protection on the development of each of the 
capital markets considered. The first variable is the ratio of domestic firms listed in the stock 
exchange of a country to its population (in millions) for the year 1996. Venezuela falls very far 
from the U.S. standard and below the Latin America average (excluding Ecuador and Chile 
which are outlying examples at the higher end for the Latin America sample, with index values 
of 13.18 and 19.92 respectively; the index goes down as low as 4.89).
10 This is initial evidence 
that lower levels of protection are related to the existence of fewer public companies. 
The second variable is the ratio of the initial public offerings of equity to its population 
(in millions) for the year 1996. In this period Venezuelan companies did not have any IPO 
offerings, which is the typical case in Latin America. Both the Venezuelan and the Latin 
                                                 
8 This index is constructed adding one if: a) shareholders can mail in their votes, b) shareholders are not required to 
deposit their shares prior to the general shareholder meetings, c) cumulative voting is allowed, d) an oppressed 
minorities mechanism is in place, e) the minimum percentage of capital that entitles the shareholders to call for an 
extraordinary shareholders meeting is less than 10 percent, and f) shareholders have redemptive rights. The 
maximum value of this index is 6 and the minimum is 0. 
9 This variable assesses the law-and-order tradition in the country and is constructed by the International Country 
Risk Guide. The lowest possible score is 0 and the maximum is 10. 
10 The other Latin America countries included in this sample are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Mexico, Peru and Uruguay. 
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American averages are well below that of the United States, which confirms the conclusion of 
LLSV (1997) that legal protection and law enforcement are positively related to the development 
of capital markets. 
The third variable is the ratio of all bank debt in the private sector to the GNP in 1994; 
the ratio for Venezuela is 0.10, which is lower than the Latin American average of 0.29, and 
much lower than the U.S. average of 0.81.  
Finally, we present the ratio of the stock market capitalization held by minority 
shareholders to the GNP for 1994. In this last case, the Venezuelan ratio is 0.08, which is 
considerably lower than the U.S. ratio of 0.58 and the Latin American ratio of 0.27 (taking out 
Chile, which is a sample outlier with an index of 0.8, this index falls to 0.18). 
Unfortunately, none of these four variables would show an improvement during the past 
few years, in spite of the recent reforms by the CNV promoting minority shareholder protection 
and more disclosure.
11 Other factors, such as political uncertainty and an economic collapse in 
2002 and 2003, may partially explain these results. 
Taken together, Venezuela’s statistics are generally lower, in both legal protection and 
market development, than those of the other countries in Latin America and well below the 
numbers for the United These statistics give us the opportunity in this research to contrast two 
very different environments (the United States and Venezuela) and to analyze the relationship 
between firm financial performance and CEO and directors turnover in a small and 
underdeveloped capital market. The conclusions drawn from this study can be important for 
other Latin American countries as well. 
 
2.3. Corporate Governance Practices in Venezuela 
 
In this section we present the results of a questionnaire on corporate governance practices of both 
public financial and public nonfinancial firms in Venezuela. The questionnaire allows us to place 
our study in context by showing the current state of corporate governance practices in 
Venezuela. Its results also lead us to suggest a set of policy recommendations that should be 
adopted by regulators in order to improve corporate governance practices in the country. 
                                                 
11 Recently, the CNV issued a set of principles of corporate governance (“Principios de Gobierno Corporativo,” 
www.cnv.gov.ve) in which a stricter definition of an independent director is provided. The principles also 
recommend that public companies should have an audit committee composed of independent directors. 
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We sent the questionnaire to each one of the 57 companies listed on the Caracas Stock 
Exchange at the beginning of 2004. The survey represents an adaptation of the Credit Lyonnais 
Securities Asia (2001) questionnaire presented in Klapper and Love (2002) to the Venezuelan 
and to the Chilean (as presented in Lefort and Walker, 2005) stock markets. The questionnaires 
were sent to each company’s CEOs and were answered mainly by the legal officers of each of 
the firms, although a number of questionnaires were also answered directly by the CEO, by the 
Board of Directors’ Assistant or by a firm’s director.
12 
  Given that the number of companies listed on the BVC is small, we needed to have a 
relatively high response rate for our results to be meaningful. To this end, we contacted each of 
the 44 companies that had not answered the questionnaires when we first sent them and were 
able to collect answers through direct interviews from 19 of these firms between December of 
2004 and January of 2005. This brought the total number of completed questionnaires to 31, 
representing a high level of 54 percent of the firms listed on the BVC. In terms of market 
capitalization, firms that answered the questionnaire represented approximately 87 percent of the 
BVC’s total market capitalization (see Table 2, Panel A). 
  As in Klapper and Love (2002) and in Lefort and Walker (2005), the questionnaire 
contains four sections or sub-indices involving: (i) general principles, (ii) officers and the board, 
(iii) shareholders, and (iv) disclosure and information. The questionnaire consists of 71 
questions, 62 of which are of the “yes/no” type.
13 A “yes” answer adds one point to the corporate 
governance score if it indicates a better corporate governance practice. We normalized each 
answer between 0 and 7 to make our results comparable to those of Lefort and Walker (2005) 
and then calculated a simple average of the results for each of the sections.  
The results are presented in Panels B, C, and D of Table 2, and they show that 
Venezuelan public companies exhibit relatively low corporate governance scores, especially in 
the categories of general principles and officers and the board. The scores on shareholders and on 
disclosure and information are relatively better. Overall results would give Venezuelan firms a 
3.79 out of 7 score, which is equivalent to 54 points out of 100. Mean results for the 14 emerging 
                                                 
12 We acknowledge that our results may be more “optimistic” about the current state of corporate governance 
practices in Venezuela than the general results presented in Klapper and Love (2002) for 14 emerging markets. This 
is because those authors’ results were based on the Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (2001) study, where 
questionnaires were filled out by analysts. In our case, questionnaires were filled out by representatives of each of 
the companies. 
13 Results from Questions 20 and 49 are not reported. 
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markets considered in Klapper and Lover (2002) yielded a very similar score of 54.11. Scores for 
the two Latin American countries considered in their paper were 57.26 (Brazil) and 61.63 
(Chile).
14 
Regarding general principles, and similar to the results found by Lefort and Walker 
(2005) for Chile, Venezuelan companies generally do not adhere to an international code of 
conduct. However, more than half of the companies that answered the questionnaire 
acknowledged having issued a mission statement that explicitly places a priority on good 
corporate governance, include in their annual reports a section devoted to the company’s 
performance in implementing corporate governance principles, and have a code of conduct with 
corporate governance principles. We suspect, though, that some of these numbers overestimate 
the reality. 
  The second section of the questionnaire involves officers and the board. The average 
score for this section was 3.92. For almost half of the companies surveyed, the CEO was also the 
Chairman of the Board and belonged to the same family or control group. More than half of the 
companies acknowledged having independent board members, and the majority have an audit 
committee, but only a few have a corporate governance committee. Although companies in 
Venezuela are legally obliged to inform the CNV of management and director compensation and 
shareholdings, a number of them admit not having disclosed this information. None of the 
directors or managers of the companies surveyed has been sanctioned by the regulator during the 
past three years, and only one of the companies ties management remuneration to the value of 
the company’s shares. This is not surprising, given the illiquidity of the local stock market. 
  The average score for the section on shareholders was 3.78. For all but one of the firms, 
each share equals one vote and multiple voting shares are not allowed. Shareholders do not have 
to be present at the general shareholders meeting to vote as long as they send a proxy. Minority 
shareholders are considered to be those representing at least 20 percent of the shares of the 
company, according to the Capital Markets Law. Minority shareholders have benefited from 
recent decisions by the CNV regarding tag-along rights to sell shares at the same price received 
by the controller when the company is sold, as was the case in AES hostile acquisition of 
Electricidad de Caracas in 2000 mentioned above. 
                                                 
14 The other 12 emerging markets studied in Klapper and Love (2002) were Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey. 
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  Finally, Venezuelan companies score relatively well in the section on disclosure and 
information. Most of the companies answering the questionnaire publish their semiannual and 
annual reports within two months of the end of the half-year and of the quarter, respectively. The 
majority of firms present their accounts according to IGAAP and are audited by an 
internationally recognized external auditing firm. Companies are also obliged to disclose 
ownership information, executive and director compensation and related party transactions to the 
CNV. On the other hand, results and other announcements are generally not updated promptly, 
companies typically do not disclose ultimate ownership information, external auditors are not 
elected by the firm’s audit committee, and external auditors are hired for consulting purposes. 
  In the Appendix at the end of the paper we present nonparametric tests and regression 
analysis on the relation between the measures of corporate value (Tobin’s q, price-to-book, and 




Table 3 presents the definition of the variables used to study the effectiveness of corporate 
governance mechanisms in Venezuela, this is, to evaluate whether CEO and director turnover are 
related to corporate performance in this country. 
To achieve this goal we construct a panel data set. The initial sample includes all the 
public companies that were traded in the BVC during the period 1984-2002. This represented 89 
companies in various economic sectors in 1984 but it had decreased to 59 companies in 2002.
15 
After excluding all companies without public annual financial proxies and information on the 
board of directors (CEO and principal directors names), and firms with less than nine years of 
historical data, the sample was reduced to 51 firms and 878 observations (see Panel A in Table 
4). CEO turnover was measured comparing the name of each CEO in year t-1 to the name of the 
CEO on year t. If the name changed we record a CEO turnover for year t. We follow the same 
procedure to account for director turnover.
16 We recorded a total of 131 CEO turnovers and 946 
director turnovers during our sample period (see Panel A in Table 4). 
 
                                                 
15 Eighteen firms in our final sample were listed for less than 19 years on the Caracas Stock Exchange. Therefore, 
our panel is unbalanced. 
16 Note that we do not know whether the turnover was forced or “natural.” We do not think this lack of knowledge 
will bias systematically our results. In any case, if there is a systematic bias, it will make it harder to find any 
connection between CEO turnover and a firm’s performance. This issue is discussed further in Section 5.  
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Regarding industries, as shown in Panel B in Table 4, we grouped our sample into three 
economic sectors: manufacturing (51 percent), financial (33 percent) and services (16 percent). 
Finally, Panel C in Table 4 shows the percentage coverage of our sample for each year. 
Although the size of the sample may seem small relative to the studies that have been 
done in the U.S. and other developed economies, it is not small relative to the number of firms in 
the Caracas Stock Exchange, since the firms in the sample represent close to 70 percent, on 
average, of the total number of firms listed, and close to 95 percent (in each year studied) in 
terms of market capitalization.  
 
3.1. Summary Statistics 
 
Table 5 shows the mean, median, and standard deviation of selected variables. Panel A shows the 
number of CEO and director turnovers, CEOTUR, which varies through the years from only 2 
yearly turnovers in 1984 and 1990 to 11 turnovers in 1996. The variation is similar in the other 
years in the sample, but it is not shown in this table. In the case of director turnover, DIRTUR, 
the number of turnover increases substantially, from a minimum of 22 turnovers in 1984 and 
1990 to a maximum of 65 turnovers in 2002. In terms of board characteristics, Panel B shows 
that the average size of the board of directors, BOASIZ, in Venezuela is around 8 members,
17 
which is smaller than in the United States
18 and remains fairly stable throughout the years in the 
sample. The maximum board size in the whole sample is 14, and the minimum is 5. The fraction 
of the board that is classified as outsiders in the annual financial reports, OUTDIR, is around 53 
percent and remains very stable during these years; for U.S. firms this fraction is 45.6 percent, 
less than what we find here.  
In terms of board independence, INDEPE, which is calculated as OUTDIR minus INSDIR 
(fraction of the board of directors that are insiders), we observe a positive independence on 
average in each year, that is, the average board of directors in Venezuela tends to have more 
outsiders than insiders in the board. However, we suspect that this proportion tends to be lower 
because it is difficult to determine if a given director is truly an outsider. The median CEO 
tenure, CEOTEN, decreased substantially in the sample: in 1984 the median CEOTEN was 8 
years and in 2002 was approximately 3 years. Also, the median director tenure, DIRTEN, 
                                                 
17 Notice that this result is basically the same as we obtained on the questionnaire (see Table 2, Panel D). 
18 See Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) for similar statistics corresponding to the U.S. market as of 1994. 
  15 
decreased in the sample from 10 years in 1984 to a little more than 7 in 2002. Finally, the CEO 
age remained fairly stable at around 55 years on average. 
Panel C presents two accounting measures of firm performance: return on assets (ROA), 
and return on equity (ROE). These ratios have been deteriorating since 1984. The average ROA 
and  ROE were negative in 1999. These statistics lead to the question of whether declining 
corporate performance is related to increasing CEO and director turnover.  
  Other variables reported in Panel D in Table 5 are firm size (book value of assets), 
FSIZEB, reported in U.S. dollars, using each year’s average exchange rate, and ownership 
concentration, OWNCON, which is the fraction of book value held by the major stockholder of 
the firm. This variable shows that firms in the sample tend to have highly concentrated 
ownership, which is consistent with the findings of Dahlquist et al. (2003) and the arguments 
given in Lefort and Walker (2005) on ownership concentration in Latin America. Finally, Table 
5 shows that for 1984, the firms in the sample had been in operation for an average of around 39 
years of operation (YEACON). 
 
4. Empirical Analysis on CEO and Director Turnover 
 
In this section we concentrate on two hypotheses: the first is directly drawn from the corporate 
governance literature (see, for example, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, and Hermalin and Weisbach, 
1998).  
 
Hypothesis 1: A CEO whose firm performs poorly will have a greater probability of being 
replaced than a CEO whose firm has performed well. 
 
Our second hypothesis is drawn from the Venezuelan’s Commercial code, which states 
that boards of directors are responsible for the management of firms. Therefore, we investigate 
whether or not director turnover is also associated with poor firm financial performance, 
specifically: 
 
  16 
Hypothesis 2: Director turnover will be greater when firm performance is poor. 
 
These hypotheses are fundamental in corroborating whether the corporate governance 
system in Venezuela is able to remove poor performing managers and directors. In what follows, 
we seek to find evidence that will help us to answer these two questions: First, is the CEO at risk 
of losing his or her job when poor corporate performance occurs? Second, are directors monitors 
of the CEO, or are they also removed when corporate performance deteriorates? 
Hypothesis 1 has already been tested in the United States. For instance, Coughlan and 
Schmidt (1985), Furtado and Rozeff (1987), Weisbach (1988), Warner, Watts and Wruck (1988), 
Mork, Shleifer and Vishny (1988), Gilson (1989), Kaplan and Reishus (1990), Jensen and 
Murphy (1990), Martin and McConnell (1991), Denis and Denis (1995), Denis, Denis and Sarin 
(1997), and more recently, Huson, Parrino and Starks (2001) have all found empirical evidence 
in the United States supporting Hypothesis 1. Table 6 presents the hypothesis, sample and main 
conclusions of each one of these studies. 
Also, using international data sets, Kaplan (1994a), Kaplan and Minton (1994), and Kang 
and Shivdasani (1995) have found evidence in Japan supporting Hypothesis 1; Volpin (2002) 
and Brunello, Graziano and Parigi (2000) have found support in Italy; Kaplan (1994b) has found 
support in Germany; and Renneboog (2000) confirms this hypothesis in Belgium.  
Dahya, McConnell and Travlos (2002) find that, after the Cadbury Committee’s 
recommendations were put into effect in the United Kingdom, CEO turnover sensitivity to 
performance increased significantly. More recently, Gibson (2003) found support for this 
hypothesis in a study of  1,200 firms in eight emerging economies. However, to the best of our 
knowledge, no published studies testing Hypothesis 1 in any Latin American country in 
particular have been conducted to this date. 
In contrast to the large amount of work done to test Hypothesis 1, Hypothesis 2 has 
received much less attention. Among the few existing studies, Coles and Hoi (2003) find that 
directors of firms who opt out of Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1310 (a bill to give more security to 
directors in the case of takeovers) are significantly more likely to keep their board seats and 
obtain new board appointments. This finding is consistent with Gilson (1990), who reports an 
increase in director turnover in firms experiencing financial distress. Harford (2003) finds that 
the overwhelming majority of outside directors are replaced after a merger or acquisition. 
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Finally, Farrell and Whidbee (2000) also document a connection between CEO turnover and 
changes in the board of directors. To our knowledge, this will be the first time that Hypothesis 2 
is tested in any Latin American country. 
The empirical analysis will follow four steps: first, we present evidence using a univariate 
test of the relationship between corporate performance and CEO and director turnover. Second, 
we explore, using a Logit regression model, the relationship between the likelihood of CEO 
turnover  (CEOTUR)  and corporate performance; this result provides direct evidence to test 
Hypothesis 1. Third, we use a Poisson regression model to determine the relationship between 
the number of director turnovers (NUMDIR) and corporate performance. Finally, we further 
investigate the relationship between director turnover and corporate performance, but this time 
we use an OLS regression model and, as a dependent variable, the fraction of director turnovers 
(BODITU). These results will provide evidence to test Hypothesis 2.  
 
4.1. CEO and Director Turnover, a Univariate Approach 
 
We first approximate the relationship between corporate performance and CEO and board of 
director turnover to determine the pooled sample correlations between our proxies of 
performance and the CEO/Director turnover variables.  
We use only accounting performance measures for this and the other tests in this paper 
for two reasons. First, many of the firms in our sample did not trade frequently during the sample 
period and, therefore, using any market performance variable reduces significantly the number of 
observations. The relative illiquidity of emerging stock markets has already been documented by 
a number of authors (see, for instance, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 1995). Also, according to 
Domowitz, Glen, and Madhavan (2001) transaction costs in emerging markets are significantly 
higher than those indeveloped markets. In fact, in the case of the Venezuelan stock market, 
transaction costs are found to be among the highest in the region (see International Finance 
Corporation, 1999). As Gibson (2003) contends, these factors, taken together with the 
documented inefficiencies of stock markets in developing countries and, in particular, in the 
Venezuelan stock market (see Harvey, 1995, and Bruner et al., 2003), render stock market 
returns a noisy signal of firm performance in emerging stock markets. 
Second, it can be argued that accounting performance results accrue strictly on the 
current CEO, whereas market performance measures also reflect the impact of market factors 
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outside the CEO’s control and the expected productivity of a new CEO (Weisbach, 1988). On 
the econometric side, Bhagat and Jefferis (2002) show that regressions based on cash flow 
estimates such as ours are more robust to variations in specifications on how performance is 
measured. Also, Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) find that accounting-based performance 
measures have predictive power.   
In Table 7, we present the correlation matrix for the pooled data set. The turnover 
variables CEOTUR, DIRTUR, and BODITU have the correct expected correlation sign (negative) 
with all our performance measures: ROA, ROAA, LROA, LROAA, ROE, ROEA, LROE, and 
LROEA; and a positive sign, as expected, for NEGINC and LNEGAINC. In terms of significance, 
almost all correlation coefficients show significance levels in the 1 to 10 percent range. The 
variable BODITU, which also measures director turnover, but in relative terms (the fraction of 
the board that turned over), is also significant in all cases. In general, we cannot infer causality 
using these correlations coefficients; however, we can state that these coefficients show a strong 
(linear) association between the financial performance measures and the turnover variables. 
In the next two subsections, we explore further the relationship between CEO and 
director turnover and corporate performance. 
 
4.2. CEO Turnover, a Logit Approach 
 
The model we use in this test is a Logit regression; this model estimates the likelihood of CEO 
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The log-likelihood function is given by (see Neter et al., 1996, for details): 
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Using Maximum Likelihood Estimator procedures we obtain the vector   that 
maximizes (2). After regressing CEO turnover with the proxies for performance and controlling 
for CEO characteristics, board characteristics, blockholding ownership, firm characteristics, and 
time period, we could directly test Hypothesis 1. We report the results of our panel data 
regressions in Table 8 using random and fixed effect specifications. Following Bhagat and 
β ˆ
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Jefferis (2002), Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999), and Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), we 
argue that the used of panel data regressions with lagged performance variables allows us to 
control, at least to some extent, for possible biases and inconsistencies due to the joint 
endogeneity between CEO turnover and a firm’s performance. 
Although we used a fixed effects specification to allow us to take explicitly into 
consideration the unobserved heterogeneity that exists among the firms in our sample, we also 
report the results using the random effect specification in order to measure the robustness of our 
estimated coefficients.
19 
As Table 8 shows, the relation between CEO turnover and firm performance is negative 
when we use LROAA (lag value of the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets 
less the median value of the ratio for all firms in the same industry) and LROEA (lag value of the 
ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total equity less the median value of the ratio for all 
firms in the same industry) as the performance measure and positive when we use LNEGINC 
(lag value of NEGAINC which takes the value of 1 if firm i report a negative net income in year 
t) as the performance measure.  
In terms of statistical significance, the coefficients for LROAA and LNEGINC  are 
significant at the 1 and 5 percent levels when using random and fixed-effect specifications, 
respectively; for these two performance measures the z-statistics are robust to various model 
specifications.
20 For example, in the first model, we interpret the slope coefficient of LROAA for 
the random effect model (-2.2922) as follows: If LROAA is reduced by 1 percent while the other 
coefficients in the model remain constant, the probability that a CEO turnover occurs 
(CEOTUR=1) increases by 10.1 percent (≈ ). In none of the models studied was LROEA 
statistically significant, although the sign was consistently negative. 
2.2922 e
−
Contrary to our expectations, the coefficient of CEOAGE is negatively related and 
statistically significant to CEO turnover in all model specifications. We can interpret this result 
by arguing that relatively old CEOs are less likely to leave the firm due to poor firm performance 
than relatively young CEOs in our sample of Venezuelan companies. This could be regarded as 
evidence of CEO’s entrenchment as they get older. Moreover, the coefficient of the dummy 
                                                 
19 See Section 5.4 for our analysis of the robustness of our results using an instrumental variables approach. 
20 In each of the random effect models we calculate the Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance. This procedure 
validates standard errors even if the correlations within groups are not as hypothesized by the specified correlational 
structure. 
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variable CEOCHA that takes the value of 1 when the CEO is also the chairman of the board is 
also negative (proxy for CEO power) in all model specifications and statistically significant at 
the 5 percent significance level for the fixed effect models. 
To control for board characteristics, we use the lag value of director turnover 
(LDIRTUR), the percentage change in board independence (LPCHAIN) and the median board 
tenure  (MEDITE). Table 8 shows a negative and significant coefficient at the 1 percent 
significance level for LDIRTUR for all model specifications. This indicates that changes in the 
board of directors negatively affect the probability of CEO  turnover for this sample of 
Venezuelan firms. For the coefficient of LPCHAIN we find positive coefficients in all model 
specifications (an increase in board independence increases the probability of CEO turnover); 
however, the coefficients were statistically significant only in Models 1 and 5 (at the 10 and 5 
percent significance level). The last variable used to control for board characteristics was 
MEDITU, showing a negative and significant coefficient (at the 1 percent significance level) for 
all model specifications. This seems to indicate that the longer the board members are in office, 
the less likely that the CEO will be removed due to bad corporate performance. This also could 
be interpreted as preliminary evidence of CEO entrenchment (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998). 
To control for ownership concentration we used the number of shareholders with more 
than 20 percent of the book value of the firm or blockholders (BLOHOL). The coefficient for this 
variable was not significant in any of the model specifications. We also used (not reported in 
Table 8) the ownership concentration of the major shareholder (OWNCON), but the coefficient 
was not statistically significant either. The explanation of these results is twofold: first, as we 
noted in Table 5, Venezuelan firms’ ownership structure is highly concentrated, so there is very 
little  between-firm variability. And second, the ownership concentration remains very stable 
during the sample year for each firm, so there is also very little within-firm variability.  
To control for firms’ characteristics, we use the natural logarithm of a firm’s assets, 
FSIZE, and the leverage ratio of debt to assets, CASTR. We find that size is positively related to 
CEOTUR. In our sample, the CEO of a relatively large firm is statistically more likely to leave 
the firm after a period of bad performance than the CEO of a relatively smaller firm; however, 
the statistical significance of the coefficient is very sensitive to changes in the model 
specification (fixed versus random effects). For the CASTR  variable, the signs and the 
significance of the coefficients are also very sensitive to the model specification.  
  21 
Finally, we control for time periods using the variable PERIOD2, which is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the observation was taken from year 1991 to 1996 (inclusive) 
and 0 otherwise. We include this variable to determine whether CEO turnover was influenced by 
the banking crisis in Venezuela (1994), where approximately half of the banking system went 
bankrupt and many Venezuelan firms experienced financial problems. The coefficient shown in 
Table 8 indicates no statistical relation between this time period and CEO turnover.  
The Hausman test for the random effects model shows that we fail to reject the 
hypothesis that the observed firm characteristics are correlated to our set of regressors at the 1 
percent significance level in Model (1) and at the 10 percent level in Models (3) and (5). The 
first response to this (Wooldridge, 2002) would be to conclude that the random effect 
assumptions do not hold and that we should focus our conclusions on fixed effect Models (2), 
(4), and (6). However, as we can see in Table 8, Models (2) and (6) also show a strong negative 
and statistically significant relation between the probability of CEO turnover and firm 
performance, although this is not the case for Model (4). 
We conclude this subsection by confirming that we find empirical support for Hypothesis 
1 in Venezuela: there is evidence that CEO turnover is negatively related to firm performance 
after controlling for CEO characteristics, board of directors characteristics, ownership 
characteristics, firm characteristics, and for the time period 1991-1996. 
 
4.3. Director Turnovers, a Poisson Approach 
 
The first model we use to test Hypothesis 2 is the Poisson Regression Model.
21 This model is 
appropriate to analyze director turnover for at least one reason: the dependent variable, DIRTUR, 
is a count variable with values 0, 1, 2, … , n where DIRTUR=0 (no director turnover) is a natural 
outcome of the Poisson process. This statistical model is a generalization of the Poisson 
distribution, where the events occur randomly and independently in time. Consider the Poisson 
parameter λ with the following specification: 
 
β λ it X′ = ln                                                              (3)                           
 
                                                 
21 For a complete explanation of the specifications of this model, see Hausman, Hall and Griliches (1984) and Neter 
et al. (1996). 
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where: X is a vector of regressors that describes the characteristics of an observation unit (firm) i 
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Note that the “zero problem,” that is , is a natural outcome of the Poisson 
distribution, and the only assumption we need to make is the time independence of observations. 
The Poisson probability density function is given by: 
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Substituting (3) into (5) and taking logs in both sides give: 
 




it it X DIRTUR e DIRTUR DIRTUR
it ′ + − − =
′ ! ln Pr ln            (6) 
 
Summing for a sample of N firms over T periods, the log likelihood function for the 
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Hausman, Hall and Griliches (1984) have shown that this function is globally concave, as 
long as X is a full column rank and e does not go to zero for all  . 
β it X
it X
As argued before, in a cross-section investigation such as ours it is necessary to include 
firm-specific fixed effects to take into consideration the unobserved heterogeneity of our sample. 
It can be shown that (7) takes the form of 
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after we include the firm-specific effect into the model (for technical details, see Hausman, Hall 
and Griliches, 1984). Equation (8) ignores the variations among firms and only studies the 
within-firm variation; this omission substantially reduces the variability of our sample. We 
present, however, the results using both models’ specifications as we did before. 
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In Table 9 we report the results of these regressions. In Table 9, all performance measures show the correct 
signs and are statistically significant,
22 except in Model (4) where the z-value of LROEA is -1.52 (p-value 0.129). 
These results confirm the inverse relationship between corporate performance and director turnovers found in the 
univariate test. In addition, the control variables show a very significant effect on the median director tenure 
(MEDITE),  the lag value of CEO turnover (LCEOTUR), size (FSIZE) and PERIOD2.  MEDITE is negative, 
suggesting that the longer the director stays on the board, the harder it is to observe a director turnover due to poor 
firm poor performance. This also reflects a possible entrenchment effect on the board. LCEOTUR is negative, 
suggesting that when a new CEO is appointed (replacing the CEO who was turnover) there is also a change in the 
board; we should therefore observe a few changes in the board of directors one year after a new CEO has taken 
charge. This is consistent, on the one hand, with the hypothesis that the CEO may also wish to remake the board 
with directors of his own choosing (Yermack, 2004) and, on the other hand, with the fact that in Venezuela directors 
are considered by law to have administrative responsibilities. FSIZE is positive, showing that in bigger firms (with 
presumably bigger boards), we observe more director turnovers. Finally, PERIOD2 is positive and significant, 
indicating that in this period (1991-1996 inclusive) there were unusual director turnovers. This result probably is a 
consequence of the Venezuelan banking crisis, where half of the banking system had to be restructured and many 
directors had to leave their firms.  
Table 9 also shows a positive sign in the coefficient of ADRUSA (a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 if the firm has issued American Depositary Receipts, or ADRs, in the U.S.) 
suggesting that firms change directors (presumably for more independent directors) before going 
to the U.S. market. However, this coefficient was statistically significant at the 10 and 5 percent 
level only in Model (1) and in Model (3), respectively. The other control variables, CEOCHA, 
CASTR and BLOHOL, show no statistical significance in any of the models.  
In the three models presented in Table 9, we find the presence of serial correlation in the 
random effects models (all Hausman tests are statistically significant at the 1 percent level), but 
this problem is not uncommon in panel data analysis (Hausman, Hall and Griliches, 1984). 
However, the main results remain similar when we include firm-specific fixed effects.
23 
These results leave us to conclude that Hypothesis 2 cannot be rejected; that is, 
performance seems to affect director turnover. In the next subsection, we will investigate 
whether or not these results still hold when we change the turnover measure for directors. 
 
                                                 
22 The estimation used the Huber/White/Sandwich estimator of variance; as we did in the Logit regressions in Table 
8. This method produces valid standard errors even if the correlation within groups are not as hypothesized by the 
model correlation structure (an AR(1)) process in this case). 
23 Remember that fixed effect models lower the amount of variation in the data substantially, because they ignore 
variations among firms and only use within-firm variations. 
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4.3.1. Director Turnovers, OLS Approach 
 
Here we perform an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation of the percentage turnover of the 
board (BODITU) as a dependent variable. This model can be written as: 
 
i i i X Y ε β + ′ =                  ( 9 )  
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In Table 10, we report the result for this model. As Table 10 shows, the coefficients of all 
performance measures have the correct sign and are statistically significant. This confirms the 
inverse relationship between corporate performance and director turnover found using the 
Poisson regression model and the univariate test. Also, the control variables display similar 
behavior, as we report for the Poisson approach. Contrary to the Poisson approach, however, we 
did not find serial correlation in the random effects models (Hausman tests were not statistical 
significant in any of the models). This finding explains the similarities of the performance 
coefficient estimates when using random or fixed effect models.
24 
The univariate test, the Poisson regression, and the OLS regression provide strong 
evidence in favor of Hypothesis 2; that is, performance affects the departure of directors for this 
Venezuelan sample. The empirical evidence shows that the poorer the firm performance the 
higher the incidence of director turnovers, which is consistent with Yermack (2004) and Farrell 
and Whidbee (2000), who found similar results in the United States, a very different context in 
terms of market development and legal framework. 
 
                                                 
24 Also, we perform the same regression using the logarithmic transformation of BODITU, and the results remained 
unchanged in terms of the coefficient signs and their statistical significance. 
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5. Robustness Checks 
 
In this section we present a set of robustness checks to our results. We group the tests into the 
following categories: lagged values of performance measures, macroeconomic controls, 
ownership structure, endogeneity problem, and forced turnover. 
 
5.1. Lagged Values of Performance Measures 
 
We run three additional sets of regressions (not shown in the paper but available upon request). 
The first uses the second lag of our performance proxies instead of the first lag. The coefficient 
of the lag value of LROAA (that is, the second lag), the lag value of LROEA and the lag value of 
LNEGINC were –1.930618 (z=-2.958), -0.3169111 (z=-2.150) and 0.3557117 (z=1.056), 
respectively for the random effect models. Note that the signs of the coefficient are all correct 
and statistically significant, except for LNEGINC, and they are even higher than those reported 
using the first lag (see Table 8). However, for the fixed effects models, although the sign is still 
correct, the estimated coefficients were not statistically significant. 
For the second set of regressions we included the first and the second lag for each of the 
performance measures. In all case the signs were correct for the random and for the fixed effect 
models and at least one of the coefficients was statistically significant. For example, the 
coefficients of LROAA (first lag) and its second lag in the random effect model were –2.047963 
(z=-3.081) and –1.440506 (z=-2.191), respectively.  
For the third set of regressions we took the arithmetic average of the first and the second 
lag values for each performance measure. For both, the random and the fixed effects models, the 
sign of the coefficients were correct and significant. The coefficient of the average lag of the 
ROAA was –3.545955 (z=-3.261) and –3.152654 (z=-1.805) for the random and fixed effect 
models, respectively. 




5.2. Macroeconomic Controls 
 
Although we control for industry-wide shocks by adjusting our performance measures by 
industry, an aggregate macroeconomic shock could have difference effects different across 
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industries and across firms. As the Venezuelan economy is highly dependent on oil, we include 
two macroeconomic controls: the annual variation of the non-oil gross national product in real 
terms and the annual variation of the national income from oil, also in real terms. 
  The regression results (not shown in the paper but available upon request) do not change 
significantly from those reported in Tables 8, 9 and 10. The annual variation of national income 
from oil was never significant, and the annual variation of the non-oil gross national product in 
real terms was only significant at the 10-percent level in the regression where the dependent 
variable was CEOTUR. 
 
5.3. Ownership Structure 
 
We use three variables to measure the impact of ownership concentration in the relation between 
turnover and performance: OWNCON, BLOHOL and ADRUSA. We run a set of eight regressions 
(all possible combinations among these three variables including not using any of them), and the 
results do not change significantly (all these regressions are available upon request).  
The empirical implication of this variable is not clear from the theoretical point of view.
25 
On the one hand, we could have a positive relation with turnover, arguing that the higher the 
concentration the better the monitoring of the CEO. Therefore a “better monitoring” history 
could explain higher turnover due to poor firm performance when ownership concentration is 
high; we would thus expect a negative sign for the firm performance proxy and a positive sign 
for the ownership proxy. On the other hand, a high concentration could also mean that the firm’s 
owner appoints a “puppet CEO” in order to extract rents from minority shareholders; therefore, 
we would expect no relation between turnover and performance and a negative coefficient for 
ownership (i.e., more ownership concentration means less CEO turnover).  
Also, and as we argued before, the low between-firm variability and within-firm 
variability in each of these three variables could explain the lack of statistical power (they were 
not statistical significant in any of our regression model). For example, only 13 firms in 
Venezuela had issued ADRs, only six firms were considered “widely held” at the 20 percent 
level (meaning that no single shareholder or group holds more than 20 percent of the firm shares) 
and only two firms were considered widely held at the 10 percent level (Banco de Venezuela 
                                                 
25 See Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Mork, Shleifer and Vishny (1988); for the emerging economies see Gomes 
(2000). 
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1986-1999, and Banco Provincial, 1984-1993). This evidence shows the high ownership 
concentration in our sample; moreover, ultimate ownership was fully identified in only 32 of the 
51 firms in our sample (individuals, families or business groups). Therefore, it is possible that 
ownership concentration is even higher when pyramidal ownership is considered in greater 
detail.
26 This demonstrates low between-firm variability, which could have an important impact 
on the power of the ownership variables in our statistical test. 
Although in our sample 31 firms had drastic changes in their ownership structure, once 
the change had occurred, the ownership structure tended to remain very stable throughout the 
period that was analyzed. Moreover, in 20 firms the ownership structure remained almost 
unchanged for the whole sample period. This demonstrates low within-firm variability, which 
could be reducing the statistical power of our ownership variables. 
 
5.4. Endogeneity Problem 
 
The variable CEOTUR and each of the performance measures are likely to be endogenous. This 
is a serious problem because it violates the crucial assumption that regressors are either non- 
stochastic or, if they are stochastic, they are distributed independently of the stochastic 
disturbance term. Therefore, the estimated coefficients are not only biased but are also 
inconsistent. 
  We deal with this problem in two ways: first, since CEOTUR,  ROAA,  ROEA and 
NEGINC are likely to be endogenous, we use in our results—reported in Tables 8, 9 and 10—the  
lag value of the performance measures and not the current value (although the results are similar 
when using the current values). Also, the main results remain unaltered when we use panel data 
fixed effect specifications, which are known to alleviate endogeneity problems (Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 1991; Himmelberg et al. 1999). However, we do recognize that the use of lag 
performance variables and fixed effect specification do not necessarily eliminate the potentially 
spurious relation between CEO turnover (and Director turnover) and firm performance. For that 
reason, to alleviate our endogeneity concerns we perform an instrumental variable analysis as a 
measure of robustness to our previous results. 
                                                 
26 For the 51 firms in our sample we have identified the shareholders with higher firm ownership (usually more than 
10 percent of the firm book value); however, in 19 cases the name of the ultimate owner was not identified due to 
the existence of pyramidal structures, which are very common in Venezuela. In some cases the ultimate owner was 
identified for a period of time but not for the whole 19 years of our sample. 
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  One of the main problems in the instrumental variable analysis is to find a truly 
exogenous variable (instruments) that affect performance but not the probability of CEO and 
Director turnover. Ideally, we will want to find an exogenous event like a change in legislation 
for example that affected all firms in the sample. However, for the period 1984-2002 we were 
not able to find major changes in the corporate law that could have been likely to be used as an 
exogenous shock (the current Commercial Code in Venezuela was approved by Congress in 
1955). Another problem is the limitation, in terms of the number of variables, of our dataset. 
We perform a two-stage estimation using INVTA (changes in fixed assets divided by total 
assets) and PPTTOSALES (fixed assets divided by total sales) as instrumental variables.
27 The 
first variable attempts to measure the rate of investment (Opler and Titman, 1994), which is 
likely to affect the current level of industry-adjusted (but not lagged) ROA, but there is no 
intuitive reason to assume that this rate of investment will affect CEO and Director turnover as 
well. The second variable aims to measure a firm’s collateral value (Himmelberg et al., 1999) but 
it could also be considered a measure of firm efficiency in terms of the amount of fixed assets 
needed to produce a unit of sale. This variable should affect (negatively) the performance 
coefficient but not, at least intuitively, the CEO and Director turnover.
28  
Results indicate (not shown in table but available upon request) that the relationship 
between CEO and Director turnover and performance becomes more negative and more 
statistically significant. For example, when the dependent variable was CEOTUR  and the 
performance variable generated by the two-stage process was the industry-adjusted ROA, the 
estimated coefficients were more negative: -13.8045 versus –2.2922 (see Table 8); and more 
statistically significant: z=-4.80 versus z=-2.66 (see Table 8). For DIRTUR, BODITU and the 
other performance measures, the results were similar, since they became more negative (more 
positive in the case of NEGINC) and more statistically significant. 
Although the instrument we use may be questionable (as all instruments are), at least we 
can affirm that if endogeneity is present in our analysis, our results in Tables 8, 9 and 10 are 
somewhat conservative in terms of the real impact that firm performance has on CEO and 
Director turnover after endogeneity is explicitly taken into account. This larger effect after 
                                                 
27 We also use as instruments percent change in sales, lag value of unadjusted ROA, lag values of INVTA, and lag 
values of PPTTOSALE, with similar results. 
28 Another concern was the use of the two-stage approach to estimate a nonlinear model using an endogenous 
variable. However, Angrist (2000) argues that this concern is more apparent than real because the coefficient 
estimation does not differ substantially when a nonlinear model is used. 
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endogeneity is explicitly considered using instrumental variables is also present in Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1991) and in Himmelberg et al. (1999). 
 
5.5. Forced Turnover  
 
As shown in Table 4, our sample includes 131 CEO turnovers. However, the information in the 
database does not allow us to determine which of those CEO turnovers were “forced” and which 
were “natural.” We try to use the age of the CEO to partially control for this effect, but we found 
a negative and significant coefficient for the variable CEOAGE, probably capturing other effects 
such as CEO entrenchment.  
  In order to find another variable that we can use as a proxy for CEO turnover, we 
construct a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO is replaced with somebody 
outside the firm (not previously attending the board of directors) and 0 if the CEO is replaced 
with somebody inside the firm. We run a set of regressions using this variable called NEWCEO 
(not reported in the paper but available upon request) and, although the sign of the coefficients of 
LROAA and LROEA is still negative, they were not statistically significant. In our data set we 
have only 71 CEO turnovers where the incoming CEO was from outside the firm.  
Although there were few observations where NEWCEO was equal to 1, our third 
performance variable, LNEGINC, is still statistically significant. Our coefficient for LNEGINC 
was 1.137925 (z=2.490) for the random effect model and 1.576682 (z=3.001) for the fixed effect 
model.  
We construct another dummy variable called FORCED that takes the value of 1 if the 
CEO that was turned over remained on the board as principal director for at least one year and 
zero otherwise. In only 65 cases is FORCED equal to one. Even when the small number of 
observations is taken into account, all the performance variables keep the expected sign, and in 
the case of LROEA the coefficients were –0.305591 (z=-1.829) for the random effects model and 





Results from a questionnaire we conducted on corporate governance practices in Venezuela 
show that public companies exhibit relatively low overall corporate governance scores, 
especially in the categories of general principles and officers and the board. The scores on 
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shareholders and on disclosure and information are relatively better. Overall results from the 
questionnaire would give Venezuelan firms an index of 54.71 out of 100. To place these results 
in perspective, mean results for the 14 emerging markets analyzed in Klapper and Love (2002) 
yielded a very similar score of 54.11. Scores for the two Latin American countries considered in 
their paper were 57.26 (Brazil) and 61.63 (Chile). Empirical tests reported in the Appendix at the 
end of the paper suggest that there exists a positive and significant pairwise correlation and 
Spearman rank correlation between each of the value measures computed (Tobin’s q, price-to-
book, and dividend payout) and the corporate governance index. The correlation between each of 
the corporate governance sub-indices and CGI is positive, although it is not significant in all 
cases. Regression analysis is consistent with these results, which ought to be analyzed with care 
given the small size of the sample. 
The univariate test and the Logit regression model provide strong evidence that 
Hypothesis 1 cannot be rejected. Also, the univariate test, the Poisson and OLS regression 
models provide strong evidence that Hypothesis 2 cannot be rejected; that is, performance seems 
to affect the departure of CEOs and directors in our sample of Venezuelan public firms. This 
finding is consistent with Gibson (2003) in that corporate governance mechanisms in Venezuela 
seem to ensure that a firm’s poor financial performance increases the likelihood that the CEO 
and the directors will leave the firm, a necessary condition for any corporate governance system 
to work. The low between-firm variability and within-firm variability in our ownership 
concentration variables may explain their lack of statistical power in the regressions. 
Our results passed several robustness tests. We used lagged performance variables and 
panel data fixed effect models to reduce the potential endogeneity between CEO and Director 
turnover and firm performance. Also, we showed, using an instrumental variable estimation, that 
when endogeneity is taken explicitly into account the negative relation between turnover and 
performance becomes more negative and more statistical.y significant. 
We also show that the relation between the CEO and director turnover with the 
CEOAGE, CEOCHA and MEDITU control variables, respectively, captured some preliminary 
evidence of CEO and director entrenchment; that is, the older the CEO, the more powerful and 
the longer the board tenure, the less likely it is to observe turnovers due to poor corporate 
performance. 
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  Another interesting result is that when the CEO leaves the firm, the directors also leave 
on average. It therefore seems that the role of board director in this sample of Venezuelan firms 
is not monitoring but rather advising the CEO. This idea could be added to Yermack’s (2004) 
conjectures that directors might be tempted to abandon the firm when the CEO leaves for at  
least two reasons: reputation and workload of a restructuring firm. Also, the legal framework in 
Venezuela makes directors responsible for the administration of the firm; consistent with this 
role, directors leave the firm when its financial performance deteriorate.  
  Our survey on corporate governance in Venezuela suggests that, in spite of recent 
improvements, a number of practices need to be revised. These include the following findings: i) 
the majority of external auditors are not elected by the firm’s audit committee; ii) external 
auditors are hired for consulting purposes;  iii) only a few firms acknowledge having a corporate 
governance committee; iv) there is a lack of transparency in disclosing a company’s ultimate 
ownership; v) there is a relatively low level of protection of minority shareholders; and vi) there 
are unsatisfactory levels of disclosure of executive compensation. More work needs to be done in 
all of these areas.   
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This table compares the Anti-director Rights, Rule of Law index, Domestic firms listed 
compared to the country’s population, IPO's to the country population, Bank debt outstanding 
for the private sector to GNP in 1994, and the fraction of minority shareholders capitalization 
to GNP for Venezuela, Latin America average and U.S.  
 
           
Variable Venezuela  Latin  America  U.S. 
        
Anti-director rights  1.00  1.89  5.00 
Rule of law  6.37  5.03  10.00 
Dom. Firms /Population (mill.)  4.28  7.48  30.11 
IPO's /Population (mill.) 0.00  0.08  3.11 
Debt /GNP  0.10  0.29  0.81 
External Cap./GNP  0.08  0.27  0.58 
           
 




Index on Corporate Governance for Venezuela (2004) 
 
Panel A: Information about the Questionnaire on Corporate Governance in Venezuela 
 
Sample Number  of 
firms 
Percentage of 




Companies contacted  57 100%  100% 
Filled questionnaires  31 54.4%  87% 
   
Source: Datastream, own sources.  
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Panel B: Summary of Results and Comparison to Chile (Lefort and Walker, 2005) 
 
Questions with “Yes” or “No” Answers 
 










I. General principles  7 3.22 7  2.63 
II. Officers and the board  25 3.92 26  4.54 
III. Shareholders  24 3.78 20  4.18 
IV. Disclosure and information  14 4.26 14  5.14 








Panel C: Questionnaire on Corporate Governance for Venezuela, Binary Questions 
 
 















  About General Principles 




Has the company issued a mission statement that explicitly places a priority on good corporate 
governance? 
 
19        12 0 4.29
 
2 
Does the company’s Annual Report include a section devoted to the company’s performance in 
implementing corporate governance principles? 
 
18        13 0 4.06
 
3  Does the company have a code of conduct with corporate governance principles?  21        10 0 4.74
 
4  Does the company adhere to an international code of corporate governance best practices?  11        18 2 2.66
 
5  Has the company issued stocks or bonds recently?  10        19 2 2.41
 
7  Is the company listed on a major foreign stock exchange?  5        26 0 1.13 
 
    About Officers and the Board      3.92 
 
8  Are full board meetings held at least once a quarter?  30        1 0 6.77
 
10  Are board members allowed to send substitutes?  6        25 0 1.35
 
11  Is the Chairman of the Board and the CEO the same person?  14        17 0 3.84
 
12  Do the Chairman of the Board and the CEO belong to the same family/controlling group?  13        18 0 3.86
 
13  Do board members meet alone without management at any time?  14        17 0 3.16
 
14  Is the Chairman of the Board an independent, non-affiliated director?  13        18 0 4.06
 
15  Are there any members of the board that are independent board members?  18        13 0 4.06
 
16  Does the company have an audit committee?  20        11 0 4.52
 
18  Does the audit committee elect the external auditor?  3        25 3 0.75
 
19  Does the company have a corporate governance committee?  6        25 0 1.35
 
21  Are there any foreign nationals on the board?  20        11 0 4.52
 
22 
If a manager or director has a conflict of interest in a transaction (i.e. he owns, is a director of, or 
works in a firm with whom the company is planning to do the transaction): a) Does he need to 
disclose such conflict? 
 
25        4 2 6.03
 
23  Does the company disclose executive compensation and benefits?  19        12 0 4.29
 
24  Does the company disclose board compensation and benefits?  23        8 0 5.19
 
25  Does the company disclose ownership by executives?  15        15 1 3.50
 
26  Does the company disclose ownership by board members?  15        15 1 3.50
  41 
 
 
















Is any board member also a board member/executive of firms belonging to the same economic 
group? 
 
17        14 0 3.84
 
28  Does the board include representatives of banks and other large creditors of the company?  4        27 0 0.90
 
29 
Has there been any sanction to the board or management for violations of Securities and/or 
Corporations laws in the last three years? 
 
0        31 0 7.00
 
30  Have board members been sanctioned for violations of their general duties in the last three years?  0        31 0 7.00
 
31  Has the board received any complains from shareholders in the last three years?  2        29 0 6.55
 
32  Is senior management remuneration tied to the value of company shares?  1        30 0 0.23
    About Shareholders      3.78 
 
33  Does each share have one vote?  30        1 0 6.77
 
34  Are there multiple voting shares?  0        31 0 7.00
 
35  Are there shares without votes (non-voting shares) different than preferred shares?  2        29 0 6.55
 
36 
Do any major shareholders of the company hold a disproportionate fraction of control rights with 
respect to his/her cash flow rights (deviations of one-share-one-vote)? 
 
5        26 0 5.87
 
37  Do shareholders have to be present in the meeting to vote?  15        14 2 3.38
 
39 
Can shareholders ask management to include items in the list of topics to be dealt with during the 
shareholders’ meetings? 
 
10        19 2 2.41
 
40  Does the company disclose its ownership structure (i.e. the ownership by large shareholders)?  21        9 1 4.90
 
41 
Has there been any sanction to the board or management for insider trading and self-dealing 
rights in the last three years? 
 
0        31 0 7.00
 
42 
Do shareholders with conflicts of interest in transactions need to disclose the conflicts if it goes 
to a vote to the meeting? 
 
18        10 3 4.50
  42 
 
43  Do minority shareholders have a mechanism that entitles them to board representation?  20        11 0 4.52
 
44 
Is there cumulative voting or proportional representation for shareholders to get represented in 
the Board of Directors? 
 
4        27 0 0.90
 
45  Do minority shareholders have veto rights over key operating and business decisions?  2        29 0 0.45
 
46  Are there super-majority rules that apply to some key operating and business decisions?  6        24 1 1.40
 
47 
Do minority shareholders have right of first refusal to purchase additional shares at the same 
price they are offered to a third party? 
 
15        15 1 3.50
 
48 
Can minority-shareholders have access to preferred stocks that may be convertible in common 
stocks, thus possessing redemption rights and forcing the control group to buy them later? 
 
2        28 1 0.47
 
49 
Can minority-shareholders have tag-along rights to sell shares at the same price as the controlling 
shareholder rights when the company is sold? 
 
























Has there been any sanction to the board or management for violations of minority shareholder 
rights in the last three years? 
 
1        30 0 6.78
 
51  Are there any mechanisms that the company offers to redress dissenting minorities?  2        29 0 0.47
 
55  Is the controller a foreign national?  15        16 0 3.39
 
56  Is the controller also part of the management of the company?  14        17 0 3.16
 





58  Are accounts presented according to IGAAP?  19        9 3 4.75
 
59 
Has the company been sanctioned for failure to publish company reports timely in the last three 
years? 
 
0        31 0 7.00
 
60  Does the company publish its Annual Report within four months of the end of the financial year?  29        2 0 6.55
 
61  Does the company publish/announce semi-annual reports within two months of the end of the 
half-year?  23        8 0 5.19




Does the company publish/announce quarterly reports within two months of the end of the 
quarter? 
 
17        14 0 3.84
 
63 
Has the public announcement of results been no longer than two working days of the board 
meeting? 
 
8        23 0 1.81
 
64  Has management disclose three-year performance targets?  20        11 0 4.52
 
65  Is the external auditing company internationally recognized?  29        2 0 6.55
 
66  Has the company hired its external auditors for consulting purposes in the last three years?  14        17 0 3.16
 
67 
Does the company have a website where results and other announcements are updated promptly 
(no later than one business day)? 
 
19        12 0 4.29
 
68  Does the company disclose ownership information?  16        15 0 3.61
 
69  Does the company disclose ultimate ownership information?  7        24 0 1.63
 
70  Does the company disclose compensation information?  15        16 0 3.39
 
71 
Does the company disclose related party transactions and/or conflicts of interest of managers and 
directors on the board? 
 
15        16 0 3.39
 
Notes: The questionnaire was given in Spanish between March 2004 and January 2005. The English translation of the questionnaire was taken from Lefort and 
Walker (2005), except for questions 53, 54, 55, 56, and 57, which are in our questionnaire but not in theirs, and except for a few other questions. A “yes” answer 
indicates a better corporate governance practice and it is assigned a value of 1, except for those questions for which a “yes” answer would indicate a bad 
corporate governance practice. Answers are then averaged and normalized for each question from 0 to 7, where 7 corresponds to the highest possible value of a 









 Panel D: Questionnaire on Corporate Governance for Venezuela, Open Questions 
 









About General Principles     
  6  What percentage of the company’s shares are traded in the stock market?  25.6%  10.5%  0%  100% 
    About Officers and the Board         
  9  How many principal members has the Board of Directors?  8.5  8.0  4  18 
 
17 
How many members of the Board of Directors are also members of the Audit 
Committee? (Only for companies that acknowledged having an Audit 
Committee) 
3.5        3.0 0 8
              About  Shareholders
38 What percentage of the company’s stock is necessary to call an extraordinary 
shareholder meeting?  38% 20% 20% 80%
52 What percentage of the company’s stock is directly or indirectly controlled by the 
controlling shareholder?  48.1 53.0% 23% 100%
  53  How many groups of blockholders posses at least 10% of the firm’s equity?  2.2  2.0  0  5 
  54  How many groups of blockholders posses at least 20% of the firm’s equity?  1.4  1.0  0  3 
57 How many principal members of the Board of Directors represent the controlling 
shareholder?  3.2 20 0 10
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Turnover   
CEOTUR  Equals one when there is a change in CEO for each firm i and for each 
year t.  
 
LCEOTUR  One-year lagged CEOTUR. 
DIRTUR  Equals one when there is a change in a director for each firm i and for   
each year t. 
 
LDIRTUR  One-year lagged DIRTUR. 
BODITU  Fraction of the board that turned over for firm i in year t. NUMDIR 
divided by BOASIZ in year t-1. 
FORCED  Equals one when there is a change in CEO for each firm i and for each 
year t and the departing CEO does not remain in the board. 
 
NEWCEO  Equals one when there is a change in CEO for each firm i and for each 
year t and the incoming CEO was not previously in the board. 
 
Board and CEO Characteristics   
BOASIZ  Size of the board of directors (number of members) for each firm i and 
for each year t. 
 
GRADIR  Fraction of the board of directors that are considered to be family 
related (same last name) to the CEO or to the Chairman of the board 
for each firm i and for each year t.  
 
INSDIR  Fraction of the board of directors that are considered to be insiders for 
each firm i and for each year t. A director was classified as an insider 
when he/she held any managerial position in the firm according to the 
firm’s annual report. If the CEO or the Chairman of the board was 
replaced but remained in the board of directors, it was classified as an 
inside director. 
 
OUTDIR  Fraction of the board of directors that are considered to be outsiders for 
each firm i and for each year t. A director was classified as outsider 
when he/she was neither an inside director nor a gray director. 
 
INDEPE  Coefficient of independence in the board of directors for each firm i 
and for year t. It is calculated as the arithmetic difference between 
OUTDIR and INSDIR. 
 
LPCHAIN  Lagged value of the percentage change in board independence for firm 
i in year t.  
  
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
CEOTEN  Number of years that the CEO remained in office for each firm i and 
for each year t.  
 
MEDITE  Median number of years that the directors of the board remained 
appointed for each firm i and for each year t.  
 
DIRTEN  Average number of years that the directors of the board remained 
appointed for each firm i and for each year t. 
 
CEOAGE  Years of age of the CEO of firm i in year t.  Source: Venezuelan 
electoral body (Consejo Nacional Electoral) database or the firm’s 
human resources department. 
 
CEOCHA  Equals to one when the CEO is also the chairman of the board for each 
firm i in year t. 
 
Performance   
ROA  Return on assets. It is calculated as the ratio of earnings before interest 
and taxes to end of year total assets for each firm i and for each year t. 
 
LROA  One-year lagged ROA. 
ROAA  Return on assets adjusted by industry. It is calculated for each firm i 
and for each year t as the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to 
end of year total assets less the median ROA for all firms that belong to 
the same industry for year t. Firms were classified in the following 
three industries: manufacturing, financial, and services and others. 
 
LROAA  One-year lagged ROAA. 
ROE  Return on equity. It is calculated for each firm i and for each year t as 
the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to end of year total 
equity. 
 
LROE  One-year lagged ROE. 
ROEA  Return on equity adjusted by industry. It is calculated for each firm i 
and for each year t as the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to 
end of year total equity less the median ROE for all firms that belong 
to the same industry for year t. Firms were classified in the following 
three industries: manufacturing, financial, and services and others. 
 
LROEA  One-year lagged ROEA.  
NEGAINC  Equals one when firm i reported a negative net income in year t. 
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VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
Other Variables   
FSIZE  Natural logarithm of each firm i’s year-end total assets in each year t.  
 
FSIZEB  Year-end book value of assets, reported in U.S. dollars, using each 
years’ average exchange rate. The source of the average exchange rate 
Bolivar / U.S. Dollar is the Venezuelan Central Bank’s web page 
(www.bcv.gov.ve). 
 
OWNCON  Fraction of book value of firm i held by the major stockholder during 
each year t  in the sample. Source: Ownership reports and legally 
certified stockholders minutes all taken from the Comisión Nacional de 
Valores. 
 
BLOHOL  Number of shareholders with more than 20 percent of the book value 
of  firm i during each year t in the sample. Source: ownership reports 
and legally certified stockholders minutes, all taken from the Comisión 
Nacional de Valores. 
 
ADRUSA  Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if firm i in year t has ADR’s 
trading in the USA and zero otherwise. 
 
YEACON  Number of years since the incorporation of each firm i in year t.  
 
CASTR  Leverage ratio measured as the year-end total debt to total assets. 
PERIOD2  Equals one when the observation it was taken from year 1991 to 1996 
(inclusive) and 0 otherwise. 
INVTA  Changes in fixed assets divided by total assets for each firm i and for 
each year t. 
PPTTOSALES   Fixed assets divided by total sales for each firm i and for each year t. 
TOBIN’S q  It is computed as the ratio of market value to book value of assets. 
Market value is the market value of equity plus the book value of 
assets minus the book value of equity. They are all computed at the end 
of 2004. 
 
PRICE-TO-BOOK  Market value divided by book value at the end of 2004. Market value 
and book value were obtained from Economatica and Datastream. 
 
DIVIDEND PAYOUT  Cash and stock dividends divided by net income. Data correspond to 
2003. They are all computed at year-end values and were obtained 
from the Anuario de la Bolsa de Valores de Caracas (2003). 
 
VOLATILITY  Annualized standard deviation of monthly stock returns for the three 
years previous to the computation of Tobin’s q. For a number of firms 
no monthly stock returns were recorded on some months since shares 
did not trade. Data was obtained from Economatica and Datastream 
and the Anuario de la Bolsa de Valores de Caracas (2003). 
 
 
LEVERAGE  Non-equity liabilities divided by total assets at the end of 2004. Data 
was obtained from Economatica and the companies financial proxies. 
 




SIZE  Natural logarithm of book value of total assets in millions of 
Venezuelan Bolivars at the end of 2004. Data was obtained from 




Operating income divided by total assets at the end of 2004. Data was 
obtained from Economatica and the companies financial proxies. 
 
GROWTH  Average annual growth of sales between the end of 2000 and the end 
of 2004. Data was obtained from Economatica, the Anuario de la 




Note: The source of the information of those variables whose source has not been explicitly identified in this table is the firm’s annual 





























Table 4. Database Description 
The database used in this study is composed of 878 firm-year observations of  
a sample of 51 firms listed in the Caracas Stock Exchange from 1984 to 2002. 
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Panel A: Distribution of sample observations      












33 19  627  90  629 
2 18  36  9  45 
4 17  68  9  87 
2 16  32  3  33 
1 15  15  0  11 
1 13  13  0  5 
2 12  24  6  43 
4 11  44  10  71 
1 10  10  2  12 
1 9  9  2  10 
51    878  131  946 
        
Panel B: Distribution of sector      
Sector  Number of firms  Percentage  Observations  Percentage 
Manufacturing 26  50.98%  446  50.80% 
Financial 17  33.33%  291  33.14% 
Service and others  8  15.69%  141  16.06% 
  51    878   
Panel C: Coverage      
Year  Sample Firms  Total Firms    Coverage 
1984 40  89    44.94% 
1985 41  83    49.40% 
1986 41  83    49.40% 
1987 41  78    52.56% 
1988 42  74    56.76% 
1989 43  75    57.33% 
1990 44  76    57.89% 
1991 46  76    60.53% 
1992 49  72    68.06% 
1993 51  54    94.44% 
1994 51  54    94.44% 
1995 51  57    89.47% 
1996 51  57    89.47% 
1997 51  62    82.26% 
1998 51  73    69.86% 
1999 51  63    80.95% 
2000 49  67    73.13% 
2001 45  63    71.43% 
2002 41  59    69.49% 
Source: Caracas Stock Exchange’s Yearbooks (Anuarios de la Bolsa de Valores de Caracas) and annual financial proxies. 
  50Table 5. Summary Statistics for Selected Variables  
This table reports the mean, median and standard deviation of a set of select variables calculated as of 1984, 1987, 1990, 1993, 1996, 1999, and 2002. Number of CEO turnover 
(CEOTUR), number of director turnover (DIRTUR), board size (BOASIZ), fraction of outside directors (OUTDIR), board independence (INDEPE), CEO tenure (CEOTEN), director 
tenure (DIRTEN), CEO age (CEOAGE), return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), book value of a firm’s assets in million of U.S. dollars taking each years’ exchange rate 
(FSIZEB), ownership stake of the biggest shareholder (OWNCON), and years since incorporation of the firm (YEACON). Definitions for each of the variables are provided in Table 3. 
 
Panel A: Turnover 
 
                                                           
                                  1984  1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 
Variable                                                                
CEOTUR                     2 8   2   7    11    7   8
DIRTUR                                 22 31 22 62 58 44 65
                                  
Panel B: Board and CEO characteristics                                                    
       1984                               1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 
   Mean  Median  S.D.  Mean Median S.D. MeanMedianS.D.          MeanMedianS.D. MeanMedianS.D. MeanMedianS.D. MeanMedianS.D.
BOASIZ  7.78  7.00  1.66    7.83 8.00 1.56 8.02 8.00 1.80 8.18 8.00 1.75  8.10 8.00 1.59 8.16 8.00 2.00 8.24 8.00 2.01
OUTDIR  0.53                      0.57 0.40 0.54 0.57 0.17 0.55 0.57 0.18 0.53 0.55 0.17 0.54 0.56 0.19 0.53 0.57 0.18 0.54 0.57 0.17
INDEPE  0.13                      0.14 0.30 0.15 0.14 0.31 0.15 0.20 0.32 0.12 0.13 0.31 0.15 0.14 0.33 0.11 0.18 0.36 0.15 0.20 0.34
CEOTEN  11.90                  8.00 10.06 10.12 6.00 10.9410.89 7.00 10.45 9.08 4.00 10.69  7.69 4.00 9.66 7.24 4.00 8.91 6.85 3.00 8.64
DIRTEN  10.14              9.95 4.17 10.14 10.14 4.66 10.75 11.11 4.52 8.97 8.14 5.36  7.79 7.80 4.70 8.74 8.18 5.07 7.55 6.83 4.58
CEOAGE  53.50      53.50 10.94 56.83 56.00 10.5455.91 56.50 9.34 55.63 56.00 11.75 53.78 54.00 11.5958.22 57.00 9.17 52.27 51.00 9.90
                                 
                                 
                               
                                 
 
Panel C: Performance 
 
                                                        
1984  1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 
   Mean  Median  S.D.  Mean  MedianS.D.  MeanMedianS.D.          MeanMedianS.D. MeanMedianS.D. MeanMedianS.D. MeanMedianS.D.
ROA  0.04      0.02  0.07 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.07  0.10 0.09 0.15 -0.02 0.02 0.14 0.00 0.02 0.19
ROE  0.12                      0.13 0.18 0.21 0.20 0.10 0.13 0.17 0.29 0.12 0.13 0.19 0.19 0.30 0.74 -0.04 0.06 0.37 0.01 0.14 0.59
                                   
Panel D: Others                                                             
                                   1984  1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 
   Mean  Median  S.D.  Mean  MedianS.D.  MeanMedianS.D.          MeanMedianS.D. MeanMedianS.D. MeanMedianS.D. MeanMedianS.D.
FSIZEB  6.91      6.72  1.64 7.50 7.49 1.76 8.44 8.59 1.93 9.40 9.59 1.79  10.53 10.84 2.22 11.33 11.02 2.11 11.84 11.66 2.25
OWNCON  0.45                    0.49 0.25 0.46 0.49 0.25 0.51 0.50 0.25 0.56 0.57 0.26  0.58 0.63 0.26 0.63 0.66 0.24 0.60 0.65 0.24
YEACON  39.18      32.50 21.79 41.22 35.00 22.3742.45 37.00 22.9045.80 41.00 22.49  48.80 44.00 22.4951.80 47.00 22.4955.39 50.00 22.43
                                     
S.D.: Standard deviation  
Source: See Table 3.Table 6. Studies on Firm Performance and CEO and Director Turnover  
 














This article tests whether both compensation 
changes and management changes are 
methods employed to control top 
management. Furthermore, it is hypothesized 
that the use of these controls is motivated by 
the firm’s stock price performance. 
 
The authors find support for their hypotheses using 
public data for the period 1977-1980 and conclude 
that a firm’s board creates managerial incentives 
that are aligned with those of a firm’s owner. 
Furtado and Rozeff 
(1987) 
The authors examined The Wall Street Journal 
between 1975 and 1982 and recorded 
appointments or dismissals of four corporate 
posts (Chairman, Vice-Chairman, President 
and CEO) to examine whether capital markets 
pay attention to these changes. 
 
Empirical evidence suggests that management 
changes raise shareholder wealth by signaling 
shifts in company policy. This is because capital 
markets respond to news related to management 
appointments and dismissals. 
Weisbach (1988) 
 
Using data on board composition for 495 
publicly held companies on the NYSE 
between 1977 and 1980, the author tests the 
hypothesis that outside and inside directors 
behave differently when deciding to remove 
managers. 
 
The correlation between performance measures 
and CEO turnover is higher for companies in 
which outsiders dominate the boards of directors. 
Also, outsider-dominated boards tend to enhance 
firm value through their CEO changes. 
Warner, Watts and 
Wruck (1988) 
This paper hypothesizes a negative relation 
between the probability of a top manager 
change and stock price performance. The 
sample is made up by 269 companies listed on 
the NYSE and AMEX. The sample period is 
1962-1980. 
 
The authors find an inverse relation between the 
probability that a manager changes and a 
company’s stock performance. This relation can be 
explained by either of these three reasons: 
blockholders, other top managers, or from 
monitoring by the board. 
Mork, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1988) 
Analyzing a cross-section of 371 Fortune 500 
companies the authors examine the 
relationship between management ownership 
and market valuation of the company. 
 
Evidence suggests that Tobin’s Q behaves 
nonmonotonically as ownership by the board of 
directors rises; first increasing, then declining, and 
finally rising slightly. 
Gilson (1989)  This  article investigates senior management 
turnover in 381 financially distressed firms 
between 1979 and 1984 (587 firm-years) 
On average, 52% of sampled firms experience 
management turnover when they are either in 
default, bankrupt, or privately restructuring their 
debt. After their resignation from these firms, 
managers are not hired by another exchange listed 







Using dividend cuts to measure performance, 
the paper examines the relation between a 
firm’s performance and its top executives’ 
service on boards of directors of other 
company’s. The sample consists of 101 
announcements of dividend cuts by at least 
25% during the period 1980-1983. 
 
 
Top executives of companies that reduce their 
dividends are 50% less likely to obtain additional 
outside directorships than are directors of 
companies that do not cut their dividends.  
Jensen and Murphy 
(1990) 
The objective of this paper is to estimate the 
magnitude of the incentives that are provided 
by performance-based bonuses and salary 
revisions, stock options, and performance-
based dismissal decisions. The data consists of 
1,668 CEOs serving in 1,049 firms for the 
years 1974-86 and as reported by Forbes. 
 
The authors find that the average CEO wealth 
changes $3.25 for every $1,000 change in 
stockholder wealth. The authors also find support 
for the hypothesis that the pay-performance 
sensitivity has decreased since the 1930s as public 




This article analyzes the role of corporate 
takeovers as a disciplinary mechanism of top 
management. A takeover is disciplinary when 
there is top executive turnover at the target 
firm following a takeover. The authors 
examine 253 successful tender-offer takeovers 
between 1958 and 1984. 
 
Top executive turnover of target firms increases 
substantially after a successful tender-offer 
takeover. Top manager turnover exhibits no 
difference in hostile and friendly takeovers.  
Denis and Denis 
(1995) 
The authors contend that forced resignations 
of top managers occur after large and 
significant declines in operating performance 
and followed by significant improvements in 
performance. The sample consists of 908 non-
takeover related top management turnover 
announced on The Wall Street Journal 
between 1985 and 1988. 
 
The authors find support for the hypothesis. 
Moreover, forced resignations are found to be rare 
and due to external factors and not to normal board 
monitoring. After the management changes, firms 
downsize their operations. Finally, normal 
retirements are followed by increases in operating 
income. 
Denis, Denis and 
Sarin (1997) 
The authors analyze the effect of ownership 
structure on internal monitoring efforts 
studying (non-routine) top management 
turnover in 1,394 companies between 1985 
and 1988. 
 
It is found that ownership structure affects the 
probability of a change in top management. The 
likelihood of top management turnover is directly 
related to the presence of an outside blockholder 
and inversely related to the ownership stake of 
directors and officers. 
 
Huson, Parrino and 
Starks (2001) 
In recent years, important changes in both 
internal and external control mechanisms have 
been documented. However, the impact of 
these changes in monitoring quality is not 
clear. The authors examine CEO turnovers at 
large public firms between 1974 and 1994 in 
an attempt to answer this question.  
The frequencies of forced CEO turnover and 
outside succession increased between 1974 and 
1994. Also, during the sample period, outsider 
representation, incentive compensation paid to 
outside directors and external pressure on directors 
varied greatly. However, the relation between the 
likelihood of CEO turnover and firm performance 
remained stable during this period, even though 
important changes in internal governance 









Kaplan  (1994a)  The author investigates the relation between 
management and supervisory boards turnover  
and their relation to firm performance in 
Germany. The sample includes the largest 
firms in this country during the 1980s. 
Management board turnover increases significantly 
with poor stock performance and with negative 
earnings. Turnover is, however, unrelated to sales 
growth and earnings growth. These relations do 
not change with measures of stock ownership and 
bank voting power. 
 
Kaplan and Minton 
(1994) 
This article investigates the determinants of 
appointments of outsider-directors employed 
by banks or by other nonfinancial firms to the 
boards of directors of large nonfinancial 
Japanese firms. The sample includes the 119 
publicly traded Japanese industrial 
corporations that appeared on Fortune 
Magazine’s List of the 500 Largest Foreign 
Industrials by Sales in 1981. 
 
Appointments of outsider-directors employed by 
banks or by other nonfinancial firms to the boards 
of large nonfinancial Japanese firms increase with 
poor stock performance. In the case of bank 





This paper analyzes the role of corporate 
governance mechanisms in the event of top 
executive turnovers in Japanese firm’s. The 
sample consists of all 270 nonfinancial 
companies covered in Moody’s International 
Reports in its 1984 volume. 
Top management (nonroutine) turnovers in Japan 
are related to industry-adjusted return on assets, 
excess stock returns, and negative operating 
income. Turnover is not related to industry 
performance. The authors also find that turnovers’ 
sensitivity to earnings performance is higher for 
firms with ties to a main bank compared to firms 
with no such ties. 
 
Brunello, Graziano 
and Parigi (2000) 
The authors examine whether board turnover 
is higher when firm performance is poor and 
whether and how the ownership structure of 
firms influence these results. The sample 
consists of 72 corporations listed on the Milan 
Stock Exchange between 1988 and 1996.  
 
Empirical evidence suggests that there is a 
negative and significant relation between firm 
performance and CEO turnover. Furthermore, this 
relation varies depending on the ownership 
structure of companies: Turnover is higher in firms 
where a change in the controlling shareholder 
occurred and lower in family controlled 
companies.  
 
Volpin (2002)  This  article analyzes the determinants of 
executive turnover and firm valuation in Italy, 
a country characterized as having low legal 
protection for investors, firms with controlling 
shareholders, and notorious pyramidal 
schemes. The sample includes all Italian 
nonfinancial firms traded on the Milan Stock 
Exchange between 1986 and 1997.  
The evidence suggests that there is poor 
governance in Italy since there exists a low 
sensitivity of turnover to performance and a low 
Tobin’s-Q when: the controlling shareholders are 
also the top managers, the control is in the hands 
of one shareholder, and the controlling 
shareholders own less than 50% of the firm’s cash 
flow. 
 
Kaplan (1994b)  This article examines top executive turnover 
and compensation in Japan and then compares 
it to the U.S.  
 
Executive turnover and compensation in Japan is 
related to earnings, stock returns and sales 
performance measures. Although the relation is 
similar between Japanese executives and their U.S. 
counterparts, the author finds that management 
turnover in Japan is more sensitive to low income 
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Renneboog (2000)  Analyzing all public companies listed on the 
Brussels Stock Exchange between 1989 and 
1994, the author examines if poor corporate 
performance precedes board restructurings 
and the extent to which, if any, internal 
governance initiates disciplinary actions. 
 
Top executive turnover is positively related to poor 
stock return performance, dividend cuts and 
accounting earnings adjusted by industry. The 
relation between ownership and top executive 
replacement is negligible. 
Dahya, McConnell 
and Travlos (2002) 
This article analyzes the relationship between 
CEO turnover and corporate performance 
after the Cardbury committee issued the Code 
of Best Practice in 1992. The code 
recommends that boards of directors in the 
U.K. include at least three outside directors 
and that the Chairman and the CEO should not 
be the same person. 
 
The authors find that after the Cadbury 
Committee’s recommendations in the U.K. were 
put into effect, the CEO turnover sensitivity to 
performance increased significantly. 
 
Gibson (2003)  The  author tests whether corporate 
governance mechanisms work in emerging 
markets. A necessary condition for this 
requires that CEOs be removed after a period 
of poor firm performance. The paper 
examines this link for 1,200 firms in eight 
emerging markets (Brazil, Chile, India, Korea, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Taiwan and Thailand) 
between 1993 and 1997 using the Worldscope 
database. 
 
Results indicate that: (1) CEOs are more likely to 
lose their jobs when their firm’s performance is 
poor, and (2) for firms having a large shareholder 







Gilson (1990)  This article studies whether corporate 
ownership and control change when firms 
default. The sample consists of 111 listed 
companies that file for bankruptcy or were 
privately restructuring their debts during the 
period 1979-1985. 
 
The evidence suggests that corporate defaults 
trigger changes in the ownership of corporations’ 
residual claims. Corporate defaults also lead to the 
allocation of rights to mobilize a firm’s resources. 
Directors who resign hold a fewer number of seats 
on other firm’s boards when they depart. 
Farrell and 
Whidbee (2000) 
This paper examines the consequences of 
removing a CEO analyzing whether the 
directors that forced the CEO to resign are 
more likely to leave the board than a matched-
sample of directors. The sample consists of 66 
forced CEO turnovers during the period 1982-
1992. 
The authors find an increased likelihood of outside 
director turnover after a forced CEO succession, 
particularly among directors that are aligned with 
the outgoing CEO, make poor replacement 
decisions, and own little equity. Furthermore, 
outside directors who are not aligned with the CEO 
and own large equity are rewarded when they 
replace a poor performing CEO with a CEO that 
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Coles and Hoi 
(2003) 
The authors examine the relation between a 
board’s decision to opt out of the 
Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1310 (a bill to give 
more security to directors in the case of 
takeovers) and the number of subsequent 
directorships hold in the future by these board 
members. The sample consists of 109 firms 
incorporated in the state of Pennsylvania that 
were also listed on NYSE, AMEX or 
NASDAQ on April 27, 1990, the date when 
this bill was enacted. 
 
Empirical evidence suggests that directors of firms 
that opt out the Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1310 are 
significantly more likely to keep their board sits 
and three times as likely to gain new board 
appointments.  
 
Harford (2003)  The author analyzes the financial impact and 
the number of future board seats held by target 
directors of a takeover bid examining a 
sample of 1,091 directors from 91 firms 
targeted during the period 1988-1991. 
 
It is found that it is unusual for a director to hold 
his or her post after a completed offer. Also, 
targeted directors hold a fewer number of 
directorships in the future. The financial impact of 
a completed merger is negative for outside 
directors suggesting a cost to outside directors 
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Table 7. Correlation Matrix for the Pooled Turnover and Performance Variables 
 
The total sample consists of 878 firm-year observations of 51 firms listed on the Caracas Stock Exchange 
from 1984 to 2002. Correlations are calculated pooling all observations in the sample. See Table 3 for the 
description of all the variables reported in this table. The coefficients reported are the pair-wise correlation 

















































Source: See Table 3. 
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                 Table 8. Panel Data Logit Regression on CEO Turnover 
 
The total sample consists of 878 firm-year observations of 51 firms listed in the Caracas Stock Exchange from 1984 to 
2002. We perform a Logit regression using as the dependent variable, CEOTUR. The performance variables are 
LROAA, LROEA, and LNEGINC. We control for CEO characteristics using CEOAGE and CEOCHA. We control for 
board characteristics using LDIRTUR, LPCHAIN and  MEDITE. We control for blockholding ownership using 
BLOHOL. We control for firm’ characteristics using FSIZE and CASTR. And we control for time periods using 
PERIOD2. Definitions for each of the variables are given in Table 3. ***, **, and * represent statistically significant 
coefficients at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
      CEOTUR
 Random Fixed Random Fixed Random Fixed 









  z=-2.66 z=-1.96  
LROEA     -0.2537 -0.0195
     z=-1.32 z=-0.11
LNEGINC     1.0135
*** 0.8293
** 








  z=-2.57 z=-3.58 z=-2.62 z=-3.79 z=-2.45 z=-3.50 












  z=-3.13 z=-4.67 z=-2.97 z=-4.56 z=-3.21 z=4.70 
LPCHAIN  0.2149
*  0.1308 0.1773 0.1234 0.2296
** 0.1513 








  z=-3.86 z=-5.64 z=-3.64 z=-5.71 z=-3.84 z=-5.70 
BLOHOL -0.1370  0.1699 -0.1199 0.1550 -0.0941 0.1644 







  z=1.98 z=1.82 z=2.06 z=1.81 z=1.97 z=1.32 
CASTR -0.7067  1.4310
** -0.6551 1.4748
** -0.6235 1.0543 
 z=1.39  z=2.04 z=-1.28 z=2.13 z=-1.26 z=1.44 
PERIOD2 0.0070  0.2189 0.0405 0.2557 0.0757 0.2653 
 z=0.04  z=0.90 z=0.23 z=1.06 z=0.44 z=1.09 















Source: See Table 3. 
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Table 9. Panel Data Poisson Regression on the Number of Director 
Turnover 
 
The total sample consists of 878 firm-year observations of 51 firms listed in the Caracas Stock Exchange from 1984 
to 2002. We perform a Poisson regression using as a dependent variable, DIRTUR. The performance variables are 
LROAA, LROEA, and LNEGINC. We control for board characteristics using MEDITE and CEOCHA. We control for 
CEO characteristics using LCEOTUR. We control for blockholding ownership using BLOHOL and ADRUSA. We 
control for firm’ characteristics using FSIZE  and  CASTR. And we control for time periods using PERIOD2. 
Definitions for each of the variables are given in Table 3. ***, **, and * represent statistically significant coefficients 
at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
     DIRTUR  
 Random Fixed Random Fixed Random Fixed 
Variables Effects  (1) Effects  (2) Effects (3) Effects (4) Effects (5) Effects (6) 
Intercept 0.4791
   0.4698 0.3593  




  z=-2.22 z=-2.42  
LROEA       -0.0894
** -0.0636  
       z=-2.35 z=-1.52  
LNEGINC      0.4595
*** 0.4087
*** 








  z=-8.05 z=-14.06 z=-7.78 z=-14.09 z=-7.14 z=-13.69 
CEOCHA 0.0213  -0.1446 0.0374 -0.1506 0.0201 -0.1572 








  z=-2.42 z=-6.28 z=-2.28 z=-6.10 z=-2.41 z=-6.27 
BLOHOL -0.0557  -0.0400 -0.0438 0.0382 -0.0308 0.0414 
 z=-0.84  z=-0.54 z=-0.67 z=0.51 z=-0.51 z=0.56 
ADRUSA  0.2223
*  0.1896 0.2682
** 0.2378 0.1624 0.1778 








  z=3.89 z=4.12 z=3.93 z=3.92 z=3.84 z=3.35 
CASTR 0.0223  0.3676
* -0.0181 0.3252 -0.0185 0.1979 








  z=2.08 z=3.45 z=2.21 z=3.57 z=2.15 z=3.59 
Observations 827 827 827 827 827 827 












     Source: See Table 3. 
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Table 10. Panel Data OLS Regression on the Percentage of Director Turnover 
 
The total sample consists of 878 firm-year observations of 51 firms listed in the Caracas Stock Exchange from 
1984 to 2002. We perform an OLS regression using as a dependent variable, BODITU. The performance variables 
are LROAA, LROEA, and LNEGINC. We control for board characteristics using MEDITE and CEOCHA. We 
control for CEO characteristics using LCEOTUR. We control for blockholding ownership using OWNERS and 
ADRUSA. We control for firm’ characteristics using FSIZE and CASTR. And we control for time periods using 
PERIOD2. Definitions for each of the variables are given in Table 3. ***, **, and * represent statistically 
significant coefficients at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
         BODITU
 Random Fixed Random Fixed Random Fixed 
Variables  Effects (1)  Effects (2) Effects (3) Effects (4) Effects (5) Effects (6) 
Intercept  0.1890








  z=-1.74 t=-2.20  
LROEA       -0.0422
** -0.0327
**
       z=-2.05 t=-1.97
LNEGINC       0.1492
*** 0.1390
*** 








  z=-6.36 t=-8.59 z=-6.38 t=-8.60 z=-6.44 t=-8.61 
CEOCHA  0.0357
*  -0.0063 0.0354 -0.0033 0.0372
** -0.0028 








  z=-2.09 t=-4.13 z=-2.00 t=-3.99 z=-2.32 t=-4.21 
BLOHOL -0.0026  0.0084 -0.0020 0.0091 0.0041 0.0024 
 z=-0.28  t=0.47  z=-0.23 t=0.51 z=0.47 t=0.12 
ADRUSA 0.0009  0.0143 0.0015 0.0210 -0.0202 -0.0139 








  z=2.97 t=3.10 z=3.01 t=3.01 z=3.17 t=2.18 
CASTR -0.0566  0.0202 -0.0514 0.0108 -0.0541 -0.0367 
 z=-1.22  t=0.36  z=-1.14 t=0.19 z=-1.20 t=-0.65 
PERIOD2 0.0223
  0.0220 0.0244 0.0237 0.0283
* 0.0272
 
 z=1.40  t=1.23  z=1.53 t=1.33 z=1.90 t=1.54 
Observations 827  827  827 827 827 827 
Wald Chi2(9)  78.13










  0.1192  0.1237  0.1618 
Hausman   10.46
   7.26 
  3.26 
 
 
         Source: See Table 3. 
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              Appendix 
Corporate Governance Practices in Venezuela and Value Measures: Non-Parametric Tests 
and Regression Analysis 
 
In this Appendix we present a brief analysis of three non-parametric tests (pairwise correlation, 
Spearman rank correlation, and a test of equality of means) on the relation between a set of three 
value measures (Tobin’s q, price-to-book, and dividend payout) and the corporate governance 
index (CGI) corresponding to the sample of Venezuelan firms and presented in Table 2.
29 We 
resort to nonparametric tests given the small size of our sample of firms and given that the 
questionnaire was conducted for only one year (2004).
30 We also present results arising from 
regression analysis. 
LLSV (1998, 2000b, and 2002) contend and find evidence that better shareholder 
protection is related to a higher valuation of corporate assets. This is because outside investors 
are willing to pay more for corporate assets when shareholders are protected. Gompers, Ishii and 
Metrick (2003) find, using data from the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), that 
firms with fewer shareholder rights have lower stock returns and firm valuations. These authors 
use Tobin’s q as their single valuation measure.
31 Fenn and Liang (2001) use, in turn, dividend 
yields as their value measure.    
Table A.1. presents a pairwise correlation matrix for the corporate governance index and 
sub-indices and the three value measures. There exists a positive and significant correlation 
between each of the value measures and the CGI. The correlation between each of the corporate 
governance sub-indices and CGI is positive and significant at the 1 percent level in all cases. 
Among the corporate governance sub-indices, only the correlation between officers and the 
board and each of the three value measures is positive and significant. The correlation between 
general principles and dividend payout is positive and significant. The correlation between 
                                                 
29 We have already cautioned about the potential problems arising from using market related measures such as 
Tobin’s q and price-to-book ratios in illiquid markets such as the Caracas Stock Exchange. 
30 Out of the 31 firms that answered the questionnaire it was possible to only include 20 firms in the tests presented 
in this Appendix. These were the only companies for which meaningful market related data existed during 2003 and 
2004. The other 11 companies did not trade at all on the Caracas Stock Exchange or traded very infrequently during 
2004. A survivorship bias may be present in our results since governance practices of listed firms are probably better 
to those of de-listed firms or of firms that are private (Leal and Carvalhal da Silva, 2005). 
31 Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1998), and Bebchuk and Cohen (2004) have also used 
Tobin’s q as a valuation measure. 
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disclosure and information and Tobin’s q and between disclosure and information and dividend 
payout is positive and significant. 
   In Table A.2. we report results of Spearman rank correlations between the corporate 
governance index and sub-indices and the three value measures. Results for the CGI are similar 
to those presented in Table A.1. They show a positive and significant rank correlation between 
CGI and each of the three value measures. The rank correlation between each of the corporate 
governance sub-indices and the value measures is positive, although it is not significant in all 
cases, except in the case of disclosure and information. 
  Table A.3. presents a two-sample t test of means with equal variances. The means of 
firms possessing a Tobin’s q above average are significantly different to the means of firms 
possessing a Tobin’s q below the average. The same result is found when the test is done on the 
price-to-book ratio but can not be found when the test is done using our third value measure, 
dividend payout. 
 
                                                                                               Table A.1.
                         Pairwise Correlation Matrix for the Corporate Governance Index and Sub-Indices and Value Measures
        Definitions for each of the variables are given in Table 3. The corporate governance index and sub-indices are presented in Section II.3. and in Table 2.
             ***, **, and * represent statistically significant coefficients at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
                              p-values are presented below each correlation coefficient.
Value measures Corporate Governance Measures
Tobin´s q Price-to- Dividend Corporate General  Officers and Shareholders Disclosure





Dividend 0.4668** 0.2032 1.0000
Payout 0.0388 0.3901
Corporate 0.5388** 0.4287* 0.5167** 1.0000
Governance I.   0.0142 0.0593 0.0197
 
General 0.3390 0.0498 0.5014** 0.5857*** 1.0000
Principles 0.1437 0.8348 0.0243 0.0067
Officers and 0.4466** 0.4462** 0.4011* 0.7908*** 0.4923** 1.0000
the Board 0.0484 0.0486 0.0796 0.0000 0.0275
Shareholders 0.3201 0.3585 0.1567 0.6141*** 0.1663 0.2629 1.0000
0.1689 0.1206 0.5095 0.0040 0.4834 0.2627
Disclosure 0.4418* 0.2959 0.3805* 0.7632*** 0.1965 0.4037* 0.3923* 1.0000
and Info 0.0512 0.2053 0.0979 0.0001 0.4065 0.0776 0.0871  
 
Source: See Table 3. 









                Table A.2.
       Spearman Rank Correlations among the Corporate Governance Index and Sub-Indices and Value Measures
Definitions for each of the variables are given in Table 3. The corporate governance index and sub-indices are presented in Section II.3. and in Table 2.
 ***, **, and * represent statistically significant coefficients at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
                             p-values are presented below each rank correlation coefficient.
Value measures
 Tobin´s  q Price-to- Dividend
 Book  Ratio Payout
   
Corporate 0.4991** 0.5193** 0.6043***
Governance I.   0.0251 0.0190 0.0048
 
General  0.3994* 0.1927 0.4420**
Principles 0.0811 0.4157 0.0500
Officers and 0.3372 0.4012* 0.5981***
the Board 0.1460 0.0795 0.0053
Shareholders 0.3764 0.3871* 0.2726
0.1019 0.0917 0.2440
Disclosure & 0.4995** 0.4315* 0.4323*
 Information 0.0249 0.0575 0.0569  
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  Table A.3.
                         Tests of Equality of Means: Two-Sample T Test with Equal Variances
                   Definitions for each of the variables are given in Table 3. ***, **, and * represent 
                   statistically significant coefficients at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
                        The null hypothesis is that the difference between the two means is equal to 0.
             The alternative hypothesis is that means are different from 0.
(i) Tobin's q Mean   95% confidence interval
q above average 1.2219 0.9388 1.5051
q below average 0.7509 0.489 1.0128
combined 1.0099 0.8006 1.2193
difference 0.471 0.1049 0.8371
t= 2.7032
P > |t| = 0.0146
(ii) Price-to-Book (PTB) Mean   95% confidence interval
PTB above average 1.7482 0.9469 2.5495
PTB below average 0.8767 0.3836 1.3697
combined 1.356 0.8607 1.8513
difference 0.8715 -0.0601 1.8031
t= 1.9655
P > |t| = 0.0650
(iii) Dividend Payout (DP) Mean   95% confidence interval
DP above average 0.8656 0.0394 1.6918
DP below average 0.3844 -1.4385 2.2174
combined 0.7854 0.1099 1.4608
difference 0.4811 -1.4132 2.3754
t= 0.5659
P > |t| = 0.5840  
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  We then proceeded to analyze firm value as a function of the CGI and its sub-indices 
using regression analysis. Our analysis is similar to that presented in Leal and Carvalhal da Silva 
(2005), and in Lefort and Walker (2005). Unfortunately, and as we mentioned earlier, results 
from regressions cannot be taken as conclusive evidence since our sample size is very small. Out 
of the 31 firms that answered the questionnaire it was possible to only include 20 firms in the 
regressions. These were the companies for which meaningful market related data existed during 
2003 and 2004. The other 11 companies did not trade at all on the Caracas Stock Exchange or 
traded very infrequently during 2004.  
In Figure A.1. we present scatter plots of our three value measures (Tobin’s q, price-to-
book, and dividend payout) and the corporate governance index for these 20 listed firms. There 
is a positive relationship between each one of these value measures and the corporate governance 
index for the sample of Venezuelan firms. 
 
                Figure A.1. Scatter Plots: Value Measures and Sub-Indices of 
Corporate Governance Index 
Tobin's q and Corporate Governance Index
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Payout and Corporate Governance Index
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Scatter plots in Figures A.2., A.3., and A.4. present the relation between each of the value 
measures (Tobin’s q, price-to-book, and dividend payout) and each of the corporate governance 
sub-indices (general principles, officers and the board, shareholders, and disclosure and 
information). In general, and consistent with the nonparametric tests presented before, the 
relation between each of the corporate governance sub-indices and each of the measures of value 
is positive and significant. In the next tables, we explore in more detail these relations using 
regression analysis.                       
 
 
                                  Figure A.2. Scatter Plots: Tobin’s q and Sub-Indices of 
Corporate Governance  
Tobin´s Q and General Principles of Corporate 
Governance



















Tobin´s Q and Officers and the Board








0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60










Tobin´s Q and Shareholders



















Tobin´s Q and Disclosure and Information




















                                 
  66 
 Figure A.3. Scatter Plots: Price-to-Book Ratio and Corporate Governance  
Price-to-Book Ratio and General Principles of 
Corporate Governance
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                                   Figure A.4. Scatter Plots: Dividend-Payout Ratio and Corporate Governance  
Payout Ratio and General Principles of Corporate 
Governance
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Source: See Table 3. 
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Table A.4. presents regression results for Tobin’s q on the corporate governance index. 
Model 1 includes only CGI as an explanatory variable. For a one-unit increase in the CGI, 
Tobin’s q increases by 2.24 percent. This result is both, statistically and economically 
significant. The other models present other specifications in which different control variables 
(leverage, volatility, growth, ROA2, and size) are included. Unfortunately, given the small 
sample size when a number of control variables are included in the same equation the degrees of 
freedom of the regression become too low. In general, CGI remains positive and significant in 
these models. The only control variable that is significant is return on assets. 
Table A.5. shows regression results for the price-to-book ratio on the CGI. Model 1 
presents only CGI as an explanatory variable. For a one-unit increase in the corporate 
governance index, price-to-book increases by 4.21 percent. This result is both, statistically and 
economically significant. The other models present other specifications in which different 
control variables (leverage, volatility, growth, ROA2, and size) are included. In general, CGI 
remains positive and significant in these models. Once again, the only control variable that is 
statistically significant is return on assets. 
Table A.6. shows regression results for the dividend payout on the corporate governance 
index. Once again, Model 1 presents only CGI as an explanatory variable. For a one unit increase 
in the CGI, dividend payout increases by 4.32 percent. This result is both, statistically and 
economically significant. The other models present other specifications in which different 
combinations of control variables (leverage, volatility, growth, ROA2, and size) are included. In 
general, CGI remains positive and significant in these models. No control variable is significant 
in these regressions. 
Table A.7. presents regression results of value measures (Tobin’s q, price-to-book, and 
dividend payout) on each of the four corporate governance sub-indices. Interestingly, the only 
sub-index that is significant explaining each of the value measures is officers and the board. 
General principles and disclosure and information are also positive and statistically significant 
explaining the payout ratio. 
Taking together with the non-parametric tests, these results suggest a preliminary 
evidence of a positive relation between market value and governance in Venezuela. Our findings 
are similar to those of Leal and Carvalhal da Silva (2005) in the case of Brazil, and Lefort and 
Walker (2005) in the case of Chile.  
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       Table A.4.
                          Ordinary Least Squares Regressions of Tobin´s q on Corporate Governance Measures for 2004
                                   Definitions for each of the variables are given in Table 3. ***, **, and * represent 
                                    statistically significant coefficients at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
                    The Huber/White/Sandwich estimator of variance was used in all regressions.
Independent Dependent Variable: Tobin´s Q
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Intercept -0.3205 -0.3597 -0.2943 -0.3385 -0.2533 -0.0556 -0.4397
t=-0.71 t=-0.79 t= -0.53 t= -0.73 t= -0.55 t= -0.07 t= -0.36
CGI 2.2429*** 2.1370** 2.2297** 2.2549** 1.8651** 2.5010** 1.2637




t= -0.12 t= 0.21
GROWTH 0.0002 -0.0009
t= 0.2 t= -0.91
ROA2 2.1336** 3.0586*
t= 2.24 t= 2.00
SIZE -0.0335 0.01786
t= -0.41 t= 0.20
F-Statistic 7.94*** 4.52** 4.14** 4.08** 5.39** 3.96** 1.83
Significance F 0.0100 0.0266 0.0342 0.0357 0.0491 0.0388 0.1703
 
Adjusted-R Squared 0.2900 0.3032 0.2906 0.2911 0.2709 0.2995 0.4461  
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    Table A.5.
                 Ordinary Least Squares Regressions of Price-to-Book ratio on Corporate Governance Measures for 2004
                                Definitions for each of the variables are given in Table 3. ***, **, and * represent 
                                 statistically significant coefficients at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Independent Dependent Variable: Price-to-Book
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Intercept -1.1400 -1.3943 -1.0931 -1.1689 -1.0398 1.5610 1.1877
t= -1.19 t= -1.60 t= -0.97 t= -1.21 t= -1.04 t= 1.35 t= 0.74
CGI 4.2100** 3.5341** 4.1888** 4.2312** 3.6353* 6.8480*** 4.8099**
t= 2.30 t= 2.19 t= 2.18 t= 2.28 t= 1.90 t= 3.37 t= 2.35
LEVERAGE 1.1794 1.8585*
t= 1.33 t= 1.88
VOLATILITY -0.0022 0.0114
t= -0.10 t= 0.37
GROWTH 0.0003 -0.0041
t= 0.15 t= -1.70
ROA2 3.2668** 3.6847*
t= 2.25 t= 1.86
SIZE -0.3418*** -0.3161*
t= -3.10  t= -2.13
F-Statistic 5.29** 3.91** 2.54 2.82* 5.31** 6.59*** 1.78
Significance F 0.0337 0.0400 0.1087 0.0878 0.0161 0.0076 0.1798
Adjusted-R Squared 0.1838 0.2791 0.1839 0.1840 0.2224 0.3550 0.3460  
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      Table A.6.
                     Ordinary Least Squares Regressions of dividend payout on corporate governance measures for 2004
                              Definitions for each of the variables are given in Table 3. ***, **, and * represent 
                              statistically significant coefficients at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
        The Huber/White/Sandwich estimator of variance was used in all regressions
Independent Dependent Variable: Dividend Payout
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Intercept -2.0900 -2.0314 -1.8944 -1.9552 -2.1552 -3.3833 -2.6549
t= -1.58 t= -1.69 t= -1.16 t= -1.56 t= -1.55 t= 1.45 t= -1.12
CGI 4.3200* 4.4808 4.2222 4.2299* 4.6835 3.0613* 3.7363
t= 1.74 t= 1.52 t= 1.57 t= 1.73 t= 1.67 t=1.93 t= 1.22
LEVERAGE -0.2778 -0.5388
t= -0.33 t= -0.43
VOLATILITY -0.0088 -0.0147
t= -0.52 t= -0.74
GROWTH -0.0015 -0.0003
t= -0.81 t= -0.13
ROA2 -2.0489 -1.4342
t= -0.83 t= -0.47
SIZE 0.1634 0.1252
t= 1.11 t= 0.88
F-Statistic 3.04* 4.15** 3.62** 1.50 1.61 1.87 1.78
Significance F 0.0981 0.0342 0.0491 0.2517 0.2294 0.1846 0.1798
  
Adjusted-R Squared 0.2670 0.2743 0.2709 0.2771 0.2879 0.3210 0.3460  
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          Table A.7.
                                     Ordinary Least Squares Regressions of Tobin´s q, Price-to-Book, and Payout Ratio on Corporate Governance sub-indices (General Principles, Officers and the Board, 
             Shareholders, Disclosure and Information) for 2004. Definitions for each of the variables are given in Table 3. The corporate governance index and sub-indices are presented in Section II.3. and in Table 2. 
                               ***, **, and * represent statistically significant coefficients at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Independent                Dependent Variable: Tobin´s Q            Dependent Variable: Price-to-Book            Dependent Variable: Payout ratio
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Intercept 0.6895** 0.1894 0.0817 0.2931 1.2391** -0.6196 -1.1037 0.2094 -0.4823 -0.9923 -0.4426 -0.7555
t= 2.99 t= 0.46 t= 0.12 t= .83 t= 2.15 t= -0.65 t= -0.72 t= 0.24 t= -1.14 t= -1.19 t= 0.32 t= -1.03
GENERAL 0.6735 0.2456 2.0040**
PRINCIPLES t= 1.54 t=0.22 t= 2.47
OFFICERS AND 1.8418** 4.4346** 3.2851*
THE BOARD t= 2.08 t= 2.13 t= 1.80
SHAREHOLDERS 1.7514 4.6409 1.7242
t= 1.43 t= 1.63 0.67
DISCLOSURE AND 1.1405 1.8241 1.9516*
INFORMATION t= 2.10 t= 1.34 t= 1.73
F-Statistic 2.36 4.33* 2.05 4.41** 0.05 4.52** 2.66 1.78 6.12** 3.24* 0.45 2.99
Significance F 0.1419 0.0521 0.1689 0.0499 0.8260 0.0475 0.1206 0.1986 0.0236 0.0889 0.5096 0.1008
 
Adjusted-R Squared 0.0667 0.1490 0.0526 0.1523 -0.0526 0.1564 0.0801 0.0395 0.2121 0.1053 0.097 0.0949  
      Source: See Table 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  72